C212-100
After the accident with the A346 of Iberia in Quito, the A320 of TAM in Congonhas and now this A320 of TACA in Tegucicalpa isn't sounding a bit alarming?
Not sure if "alarming" is the word to use in flight safety or investigation work, but "interesting" might do...
All 3 were on wet runways and the first two had difficulties with spoilers, reverse and braking. The TACA 320 appears to be in forward thrust and except for #5 on the starboard wing, the spoilers appear to be retracted.
Manufacturers resolve the problem of spoiler/reverse deployement in the air in different ways - for the DC8 it was the nose oleo compression that deployed spoilers, (reverse was always available). Not sure what it is for the Boeings.
The Lufthansa A320 accident at Warsaw was brought up in the Congonhas thread with regard to the availability of spoilers, reverse and braking. After the Warsaw accident, Airbus changed the software "on-ground" logic such that partial spoilers would be available with an initial compression of one main-gear oleo. Previously, until both oleos were "on-ground", the spoilers would not deploy and system logic prevented auotmatic-braking and reverse, (manual braking was always available). Config 3 landings were Airbus-"recommended" under these circumstances after the accident. In the data we examine however, we see very few Config 3 landings.
If I recall correctly, the Quito accident appears to have been caused by damage to the oleo position sensors which prevented the ground spoilers from deploying which in turn prevented the availability of reverse.
The DFDR will tell the investigators the usual things about touchdown speed, g-loads, oleo compression, spoiler/reverse positions, thrust-lever position, brake-pedal deflection, brake pressures, anti-skid operation etc etc. The initial interest will likely be around such systems and their performance.
PJ2