I can only agree with tuc. I have seen exactly the same things happen when one IPT wriggles out of it's airworthiness (and moral) responsibility to another - and were permitted to do so because there was not sufficient oversight to make sure these things did not fall between the cracks. Sadly, despite what we say about safety, money is available only for capability, not airworthiness per se.
John Blakely,
I think we are in violent agreement - sorry if my brief post earlier did not make that clear. I too feel that DARS should have 'teeth' and be able to enforce standards. I would add one more thing in to the discussion though. You say that you feel that
the principles of military and civil airwothiness should be the same - the risks are different not just because the roles are different but because the military relies on different equipment some of which is operating in an inherently more risky role
and if I read you correctly you feel that DARS should regulate airworthiness in the way the CAA does.
I feel there is a subtle but important difference in the principles of military and civil airworthiness. In my experience, civil airworthiness relies much more on enforcing particular regulations and building/maintaining to particular standards, and less on what the military
should be concentrating on, a systems approach to risk management. Now I know that this is practised in civil aviation, mostly at the design stage and to a very high level, but the point I want to make is this. If you buy an airliner, you are very likely to use it in exactly the way the manufacturer envisages. With military aircraft, it is difficult enough to give a designer a clear idea of what you
intend it to do at the start of its life, much less how you will actually be using it 20 years down the line. This can have some really serious consequences, like 10000 hour lifed parts wearing out after less than 100 hours because the aircraft is being flown in a way the designer didn't envisage.
As you rightly point out,
for both military and civil airworthiness the final "guarantee" that the aircraft is airworthy and "fit for purpose" rests with the User
and I think this is probably the key weakness of the military system - the sqn commander who tells his crews that they should all fly at Vmax is in my opinion creating a much bigger airworthiness issue than the SEngO who authorises fit of a part-worn component - and at least the SEngO is aware of his airworthiness responsibilities in this sense.
This is probably exactly what you were getting at when you said that the decisions should be by informed people and I do agree with the main thrust of your post though. The example of Chinook Mk 2 is spot on.