The Role of DARS
OA,
Tuc has already covered part of what I would have said (clearly he stays up later than me!), and I do not disagree with the underlying comments you make about the military role - but I do question whether we are misusing terms. As I wrote on the Nimrod thread a few days ago as far as I can see the principles of military and civil airwothiness should be the same - the risks are different not just because the roles are different but because the military relies on different equipment some of which is operating in an inherently more risky role - even as an engineer I have experienced the thrill of terrain following radar ride in a Tornado, and I wouldn't want to try it in a 737. However, for both military and civil operations the achievement of the mandated airworthiness standards starting from the design through to day to day maintenance is, I suggest essential. It is here that the new DARS and the CAA part company in a big way - look at the CAA web site and their involvement in the regulation of airworthiness and you will see what I mean. Yes, for both military and civil airworthiness the final "guarantee" that the aircraft is airworthy and "fit for purpose" rests with the User, but the regulation of that policy does not. Indeed for the MOD it should not either - as Tuc has said the procedures are in place but where are the teeth (and funds dare I say despite MOD's "promises" that safety is paramount) to enforce it. The procedures have not been followed on numerous occasions with the crew of XV 230 paying the ultimate price - by the RAF's own admission.
Yes the military has to accept the higher risks of military flying in both operations and training, and at the end of the day the User probably has to have the right to make his own final decisions even on airworthiness risks if the operational imperative is there - but these decisions should be informed ones - not for example being made by unqualified 1 and 2* supply officers or administrators or driven solely by money as seems to have happened quite a lot recently. Such decisions should be the exception not the rule and also, I suggest, need monitoring so that an operational imperative to operate an aircraft not reaching the mandated airworthiness standards, such as the Chinook Mk2 being flown against the advice of the flight test authority, is only used for vital operations and not to fly 25 passengers across the country - an even worse loss of life than XV 230!
If the DARS has teeth (and qualified resources and funding, and even the ability to report direct to the SofS perhaps) as per the word "regulate" in the first paragraph of its mission statement maybe this will fit the bill - I wonder why I have doubts. If for no other reason MOD is going to have to get this right before it faces even larger compensation claims that it probably faces already. Some may not like it, but comparisons with the last century's World Wars are irrelevant. We are not in a situation today where a failure to have equipment that is fit for purpose can be ignored because "the military are paid and expected to take these risks". It is not so comfortable for the MOD and even the day to day decision makers anymore for all sorts of reasons - but having poor kit or unairworthy aircraft should not be adding to the risks that cannot be avoided - we do not have enough resources to go down that road anyway! There is nothing operational about losing an aircraft and, worse, a crew in the circumstances that XV 230 was lost.
JB