However, I find the lack of ANY further information on that front, even if it is just to close off the fuel itself as possibly being a contributor (with evidence to back it up), to be very odd.
Same can be said about the spar valves.
The AAIB states: "The spar valves and the aircraft boost pumps were serviceable and operated correctly during the flight."
No reference has been given as to how the AAIB came to that conclusion. Logically this would mean recorded data is available, at least that is the perception when reading the report . . . . .
Perhaps the final report will explain how the AAIB came to this conclusion.
Also, i wonder when approach idle was activated over minimum idle.
Was this activated by engine anti-ice or during landing flap selection?
If it was activated during landing flap selection, the thrust increase from minimum idle to approach idle (if the aircraft was indeed following a CDA profile at minumum idle) must have occurred during intermediate/final approach, sometime before the final thrust increase and rollback?
If it was activated by engine anti ice, there would have been a cycling between minimum- and approach idle several times, each time engine anti ice activated and de-activated, before landing flap was selected. In both cases, with landing flaps selected, the engines would have been in approach idle when the problems started.
Green-dot