Equivocator
Tuc
By your estimation then, anyone with more than 300 hundred hours should have been subject to a significant flight safety incident...
I think you know I was illustrating the concept of cumulative risk, and the figures I chose were deliberately ridiculous such that no-one would think them real.
I wanted to show that a broadly acceptable risk could change in classification through time due to external factors, and simply point out that there must be a management process to identify this and determine when it moves into a higher risk class (Tolerable, if ALARP or Unacceptable).
Everyone talks about the risks/hazards associated with couplings and seal and leaks, which is fine. Perfectly valid. But the actual criticism in the BoI report, which led to Browne accepting liability, is that MoD didn't implement the regs. Failure to implement them MUST have an associated risk (cause and effect). One may start out with good intent, and the probability of occurrence is remote, but the events I listed are very real and, in my opinion, changed the nature of this risk significantly over a long period. That is why the regs require experience and retention of corporate knowledge. If you lack either, a new Risk or Safety Manager coming into the IPT for a 2 year tour (and these roles are very often minor tasks among many others) will think his inheritance is a long term stable position; but in fact he has a very unstable foundation for one of the pillars of airworthiness.
If you mitigate THAT risk, the benefits flow down and automatically help to mitigate other risks.
Best wishes