Instead of discussing discrete issues, try thinking about risk / safety management this way. When we talk about probability of occurrence, we say the chances of an event happening must be at least one in, say, 1000. Fine, analysis of the initial design, coupled with the mandated processes for maintaining this figure, shows one in 1500. Go for it, the risk is “broadly acceptable”.
We have infant failures etc and re-assessment shows 1:1400. OK. Now, consider this scenario. Call it hypothetical if you will (at your own peril);
This bottoms out and stability is achieved, then some clown says “OK, that’s enough; we’re mot monitoring reliability any more – we moving from proactive to reactive”. 1:1250 now.
Then he says, no problems last year, so this year we stop amending tech pubs. 1:1150.
Then, no more obsolescence tasks. 1:1050.
Then, no more single Fault Investigations (MF760s), you must save them up and when you have (x) you raise an omnibus request. 1:950.
Now, no configuration control, you will only address safety tasks. 1 -in-800.
Now, NO SAFETY TASKS. 1:650.
Above funding cuts force Service Users to expand the boundaries of Service Engineered Modifications into complex system design, without access to a maintained build standard, skills, expertise etc. 1:550.
Are you beginning to appreciate the cumulative effect?
But, even worse (because they should know better), MoD(PE) 4 Star “I don’t want experienced engineers”. 1:400
Then, his 2 Star “System integration is optional”. 1:300
Then, “Achieving fitness for purpose is optional – it is ok to pay off a contract knowing the aircraft is unsafe”. 1:200.
Question – At what point did the risk that mandated airworthiness regs were not being implemented properly move from “Broadly Acceptable” to “Tolerable, if ALARP” and then to “Unacceptable”? (And yes, the risk was notified and recognised; there are numerous public domain reports proving this). Was the Senior Officer in charge managing this situation, was he merely monitoring it, or was his head buried up his a##?
Then, tragically;
Tornado/Patriot (BoI - IFF failure warnings not integrated properly)
Sea King ASaC (BoI- Anti-collision light system not fit for purpose)
Hercules (Failure to implement airworthiness regs, as witnessed by post crash agreement to retro-fit ESF).
Nimrod XV230.
MoD, May 2008 - “It’s ok if we’re moving toward ALARP”. Really? WTF did you move away from it in the first place?
RIP each and everyone of you. CBs and knighthoods to the ####wits who oversaw all this. My utmost contempt for those who stood back. Best of luck to those who still serve. The above indicates you need it.