BA appear convinced that the flap reduction was beneficial, but nothing still from the AAIB on that
Hopefully this post will not be swept up and deposited in some other area of pprune as we are talking about the selection of 25 flap.
Surely the job of the AAIB is to establish what happened to cause the situation and 100% of their efforts should be focused on that. On the way they may come across items that need immediate attention in the form of directives (as was the case when it was realised that the order of operation of the fire handles and fuel cut-offs could effect the closing of the spar valves) but their job is not to feed titbits to the many flightless birds around the bird table here on Pprune
They are aware of what other actions the crew took in those few seconds, and the effects those actions had on the flight profile, and I am sure they will come out in the full report.
Their interim reports have been factual and (correctly) have not focused on whether the crew "allowed" the aircraft to stall or, as the A/P cutout held onto what speed was still available by lowering the nose.
Lets not forget, the crew had less than 50 seconds, no "electronic checklist", no simulator training, no ops manual guidance, very little EICAS information, attitude increasing to that of the dear old Trident (with rapidly dissapearing visual sector) but still managed to stick to the basic BA procedure of the handling pilot flying (initially in this case using the autopilot) while the other two (remember there was an extra crew member on the flight deck) pilots trying various actions (not all reported so far) to restore the power to "normal levels" and at the same time accepting the worst and retracting the flaps to 25 which has (again not been officially quoted) been calculated as giving them an extra twenty eight feet, allowing them to clear the localiser array by seven feet.
Lets focus on what a good job they did and allow the AAIB (without criticism of not giving us the "total" picture) to find out why it happened.