The common denominator here is the failure to implement the airworthiness regs.
Absolutely.
It only remains for Mr Haddon Cave to find out who failed.
There was clearly a failure to accurately describe the risk controls in that dry bay.
S_H
Quote:
In a nutshell, the MOD shot itself in the foot when it mandated a safety case that was not required by law, which then turned out to be erroneous. Ed Set
unquote
No Ed, it did not. Assurance of safety under a safety case regime is widely regarded as best practice in this country. Power Generation, Nuclear, Chemical, Rail, ATM, Offshore to name a few, all take this approach. S_H
Thats true. But those working in/for the MOD failed to do the job properly, so they let down the MOD/RAF and the crews; one in particular). The irony of all this is that if the IPT had not carried out the NSC, the accident would still have happened and the Nimrod design and its operation would be subject to greater scrutiny. Maybe it will be, next week.