EdSett,
I think since your post others have re-iterated the MAA / Safety Case / airworthiness issues well enough, but I'd like to pick up on a contradiction in what you have posted:
Air Cdre Beber laid out the existing mechanism that provides the airworthiness requirements under BCARs. Regardless of individual opinion regarding a conceived need for a military aviation authority, that mechanism is robust. The mechanism and tools comprised the design, testing and limitations in the Release to Service and all supporting documents. These alone met the BCARs and the Nimrod was certified using the Comet and the Nimrod MR1 as the baseline design to meet the BCARs for certification of the MR2, as a modification of the original model.
vs
very critical in hindsight of the design of the 7 Tank Dry Bay and indicated that BAe produced a flawed design and that the IPT has missed an opportunity (the NSC) to identify that flaw.
If the mechanism was robust, a flawed design would not have been certified; or if the orginal design was robust, subsequent modifications would also be safe.
sw