JFZ90:
Be careful not to lump together and confuse different complex issues.
Well I am lumping them together, or rather they lump themselves together in my view, and the thing that lumps them together is their shortfall in airworthiness. The Nimrod you tacitly concede I think, so perhaps therein we agree. The Hercules was bereft of a technology, ie ESF, adopted by our closest ally from whom we obtained the fleet. You say:
a military risk/threat decision was made long ago not to bother with some technologies which may or may not have had any effect in any case. This is not really an airworthiness issue in the traditional sense, as bad guys firing bullets/rockets at you is always going to be a dangerous situation with risks that cannot be fully mitigated.
Well quite, and that decision adversely affected the military airworthiness of the fleet, ie its fitness for purpose. It is possible that the hostile action that brought down XV179 might have been survivable with ESF. We don't know, but without it there wasn't a chance. Mitigation of risks is surely what Airworthiness is all about isn't it?
You say regarding Chinook:
The MAR/FADEC issue was a red herring.
Really? I'm afraid I would disagree. As I understand it Boscombe Down disagreed also. Note, I do not say that problem was a factor in the Mull accident, as you say we don't know (well other than Messrs Wratten and Day). I do say that the type was being operated with less than proper Airworthiness protection. Another MOD decision?
My point about who said or did what etc, is not that it is unimportant, of course it is and must be revealed. It is rather that the urgent need is not for investigation or introspection, but total reform of the Provision of Military Airworthiness in the UK. I take note of tuc's conclusion that it is probably beyond resurrection in its present form. In order to mitigate (that word again!) future needless loss of life it must be speedily removed from the MOD and placed in an Independent MAA.