I've been receiving accurate info from the inquest and there have been some quite interesting facts come to light this week:
Air Cdre Beber laid out the existing mechanism that provides the airworthiness requirements under BCARs. Regardless of individual opinion regarding a conceived need for a military aviation authority, that mechanism is robust. The mechanism and tools comprised the design, testing and limitations in the Release to Service and all supporting documents. These alone met the BCARs and the Nimrod was certified using the Comet and the Nimrod MR1 as the baseline design to meet the BCARs for certification of the MR2, as a modification of the original model.
The Nimrod Safety Case (NSC), which is not required for legacy systems before the HSAW Act, was carried out because the MOD's JSP indicated that, in general, it would be sensible to gather as much data as possible in order to provide an argument that the legacy aircraft also met the principles required under the HSAW Act. So, in essence, the safety case was an MOD generated requirement thus, again, demonstrating that there is no need for an MAA, Chug. There is more than sufficient self-regulation. The NSC was carried out in 2 phases: phase one was hazard identification, to be completed by a contractor through physical examination, (BAe in this case) and phase 2, which was to examine, among other things, what mitigation was in place to safequard against any hazard established in Phase 1. Phase 2 was carried out jointly, by discussion only, by staff of the IPT and employees of BAe.
Evidence was given to the Coroner, by Air Cdre Beber, that a member of the IPT had entered into the database incorrect mitigation against a remote hazard that could have catestrophic consequences. That database, as part of the NSC, was produced by both parties and formally accepted at a minuted meeting attended by a a senior member of the IPT (not the IPTL). (my thoughts here: although a staff member of the IPT entered the incorrect data, it could be reasonable to assume that he did so following a discussion with someone else - RAF or BAe). However, to quote Air Cdre Beber, "The buck stops with the IPTL".
Tuc, you say the SoS has responsibilty. Beber stated, quite clearly, that the IPTL is the Type Airworthiness Authority, insofar as what he says, goes. Therefore, he recognised that no-one above him can take reponsibility for actions that he alone can authorise without reference to those above him. He makes the decisions, he takes responsibility. Those staff below him have no authority so they cannot be held responsible for airworthiness.
Air Cdre Beber was, quite correctly (IMHO, and that of the AAIB), very critical in hindsight of the design of the 7 Tank Dry Bay and indicated that BAe produced a flawed design and that the IPT has missed an opportunity (the NSC) to identify that flaw. BAe's counsel refuted the suggestion that his client was solely involved in putting the flawed design into the air by producing a document outlining the acceptance, by the RAF, of the SCP design. I'm sure that the Coroner has heard this type of discussion many times before and he will have a case book to guide him. It is intriguing that BAe did not contest the assertion that they produced a flawed design.
Apparently, one or two press reporters have been in the gallery every day, taking notes. I recommend a search through the Sunday papers tomorrow to hopefully see some accurate reporting of this week's evidence.
Portsmouth for the cup !
Ed Sett