One of the problems with training for the multirating is all engine failures are
1) expected, and
2) always total.
Unfortunarely the real world is rarely so accomadating. Many engine problems manifest themselves as engine surges ( can be intially difficult to detect as airplane yaws back and forth) or partial failures ( potentially leading to shutting down an engine producing power ) or prop under or overspeed. While in theory rotation below VMC followed by engine failure can be survived by instantly reducing power on the operating engine, I would suggest that in practice most pilots are going to wind up as a smoking hole in the side of the runway
By the way one of my pet peeves is frequent discussion on this forum about how pilots will evaluate the situation and then use their judgement to decide how to deal with an engine failure during takeoff. Airlines have a defined go no decision point with a set of unvarying actions before and after that point.
This came about after many crashes proved preprogrammed responses to these kind of emergencies was the most effective way to deal with an engine failure during the takeoff sequence. So what makes PPL's think they have more cognitive power to dal with a bad situation, than a 30000 hr airline pilot who will only utilize rote preprogrammed responses
Thar is why the owner and I adopted the proceedure I outline in my earlier post. It is the closest we could think of to duplicate the airline SOP.
