At the end of a very long day, according to CASA Captain HWANG SA SIK,
a previous 30 year Korean Air Captain, I failed my check ride. I do
not accept his appraisal and am insulted by his masquerade of
fairness. His business card has the audacity to display "Trust
Builder" in its title. This CASA official lied and exaggerated events
regarding many of the events of my flight. Because of this action he
is corrupt and is involved in an unknown personal agenda. Why did he
do this? Maybe he was forced to retire from Korean Air at an early
age and this is a grudge. Maybe he is still sympathetic to the union
activities at Korean Air. Since everyone else on all the other fleets
passed their check ride, the results of the B-777 are too unusual and
suspicious to ignore. Statistically, if the check ride was a fair and
unbiased evaluation, it would be impossible that most Foreign Captains
fail the check ride from the same CASA Hwang. Grounding the B-777's
because there are not enough pilots to fly them is a more likely
scenario and certain to make a statement. CASA Hwang graded me on
techniques that he insisted were procedures. I will go into the
details later in this report. As you know, there are no more second
chances after your Operational Experience (OE) 12 + 4 sectors. There
are no more training rides given and since there is only one CASA
pilot giving the check rides on this aircraft, chances of a successful
recheck would be infinitesimally small. Based on Korean Air past
practice, most pilots have been fired after failing the check ride and
attending the obligatory/compulsory meeting. Excellent pilots have
been cheated by CASA and KOREAN Air and sent home after 4 months of
extremely hard work. Needless to say, I was angry at the result but
not shocked! I knew the chances of success were slim based on the
statistical results of the previous two B-777 classes. You shouldn't
expect to pass if statistically only one in your class will make the
grade. However, I have never failed a check ride in my 30 years of
flying and in my opinion; this should have been no exception. I will
admit it wasn't perfect by Korea Air Standards, but, as all of you
know from your own experience, how could it be? Many standards are an
unknown moving target. For instance, have you seen check ride
criteria from CASA? Does it exist? If it does exist, does it live up
to the farcical written English standard of the CASA Korean Air Law
test? Could it be read and understood by the person taking the check
ride? No standards were briefed to me by CASA and he certainly did
not live up to mine. The pilot world should know of this corruption
before wasting their time and effort in Korea .
In the spirit of trying to do my best, I tried to brief endlessly and
never stopped saying "check" in meaningless fashion. In the end it
didn't count because CASA says I failed and that is all that matters
in Korea . There were no safety issues on my check ride, although
according to CASA he tried very hard to create some by making up a
story about me turning on the wrong taxi way in Hong Kong (although I
wrote the instructions down and it was verbally verified correct by
the LCP in the right seat). I've been taxing for 34 years and even if
it did happen, (which it did not), it would have been a NON-EVENT.
There were no other airplanes on the taxiway and we were not involved
with crossing any runways or creating a traffic conflict. He CREATED
the story to fail me. He created even more stories that night AFTER
my debriefing was finished in order to solidify his position in his
report - which was written in Korean. I have no doubt he would have
created more if needed. He harassed me from the minute I got into the
cockpit in Incheon airport with questions (I had taken the oral less
than 24 hours earlier - the calendar day prior) and even on several
occasions commanded that I take certain action during the flight which
I can't find in any book anywhere. I have been surprised on every KAL
flight with something new and different so I took it all in stride
hoping that at the end of the day he would still be reasonable and I
would become a Korean Air pilot. I maintained my composure and
temperament until the end of the check ride debriefing following the
two flights. At the end of the day I was mistaken. Reason and sanity
did not prevail.
CASA Hwang intentionally and selectively neglected standard
procedures. He had total disregard for cockpit security by freely
opening and closing the cockpit door in flight without following the
established procedures in the FOM. He did not follow the security
procedures briefed by me during the Joint Briefing. He also said we
didn't have to put on our oxygen masks when going to the bathroom even
though we were at FL 360. He said we could eat at the same time
(which I didn't), anyway, you get the picture. He followed the rules
HE wanted to follow and disregarded those that didn't suit him. He
violated MANY Korean Air procedures….. and then he had the nerve to
grade ME poorly.
He fabricated the facts - blatantly lied, and even added things to my
check ride form after he left the room. OE Chief Pilot Captain Kang
met with me two days later and read to me the new items. For
instance, I couldn't believe that CASA Hwang had added that I didn't
do one of the checklists. Absolutely incredible! He had not
mentioned that to me on the day of the check ride. I know for a fact
that I called for every checklist. (I did call for the climb
checklist 1000' too early passing transition altitude (9000' and
climbing at 2500'/min out of Hong Kong ), but it was NOT forgotten. I
guess he must have realized that there wasn't enough bad stuff on the
original evaluation to justify failing me so he just added some more
lies. I couldn't read the form since it was in Korean. It wouldn't
matter anyway. I asked both CASA Captain Hwang and OE Chief Pilot
Captain Kang for the voice tapes from the aircraft (if available), and
Hong Kong ground control. They refused.
CASA Hwang summed it up best in the debriefing following my check
ride. After I had objected to his statements that had no basis of
truth he said: "They are true! I am CASA". Spoken loudly as if he
were GOD.
I am sending this report to you so you can hear it from me personally
instead of the "spin" that will surely be put on their version of the
truth by CASA and Korean Air. I doubt that Korean Air Management will
ever hear my version. I have no doubt that they will simply repeat
their standard answer to those that ask. Their standard answer is
what Korean Air said about the previous classes poor success rate when
we said we were concerned…they said "they were not qualified" and "did
not live up to Korean Air Standards". I don't understand why they
behave in this manner! Why would they fail almost everyone going
through a program? I won't go into politics and the potential labor
issues that surround the parking of the new B-777 aircraft while
foreign pilots are being trained - instead of Korean pilots. Parking
airplanes carries a lot of leverage and sends a strong message for
those that are listening.
Regarding techniques taught as "procedures": On my check ride I
learned of even more techniques that were taught as "procedures".
These were procedures that I had never heard of from my FIVE previous
Korean Air instructors. For instance:
1. FLAPS: On initial approach to Incheon Rwy 33R, in a critical
phase of flight, I learned you can't go from flaps UP directly to 5
degrees (skipping flaps 1), even if your airspeed allows it.
According to CASA you CAN'T select flaps 1 until you have SLOWED to
clean speed - in spite of the fact that Boeing allows it, and in spite
of the fact that I was approximately 6 miles from the FAF and ATC had
required me to maintain 230 kts to close a space in front of me. I
was already trying to slow down, I was descending ON GLIDE PATH WITH
FULL SPEED BRAKES and ATC had given me an overshooting turn across
final. I was trying to correct back to Localizer. During this same
time the CASA checker was verbally chastising me (below 10,000 sterile
cockpit) for calling flaps 5; I was thinking about "stabilized
approach criteria", FOQA, and CHECK RIDE all at the same time. I got
the aircraft stabilized by lowering the gear and going to flaps 20
after having to demand it, and trying to get the checklist completed
while they both were commenting in Korean (probably about my non
standard command for flaps) (no sterile cockpit below 10,000). I
should have just gone around for needless breach of sterile cockpit
rules below 10,000 and the unsafe distraction from the more important
task at hand. However, I also realized that if I had done a go
around, it would have been another reason for failing me on my check
ride. I know flying is dynamic. You MUST be able to adjust to the
situation you find yourself in and not be confined by some artificial
classroom flight technique being taught as procedure that have
absolutely no basis of reason from Boeing, (the manufacturer), nor are
those techniques based on logical or sound aerodynamic principals in
general, given the circumstances and phase of flight I was in.
Sometimes you need to look at the bigger picture. We only had 15
minutes of holding fuel. The next approach would have been minimum fuel.
2. TURBULENCE: I also found out that it is a procedure for LIGHT
turbulence that you must speed intervene and go to Mach .82. I just
thought that was for something more serious such as moderate
turbulence when your airspeed might actually be affected; I have
done plenty of speed interventions in my time, but never for light
turbulence. I had already placed the seat belt light on before they
said anything. CASA intervened and insisted I use `speed
intervention'. Five to Ten minutes after CASA intervened to tell me
to select Speed Intervention the turbulence did eventually increase to
moderate. It could have just as easily disappeared. I would have
selected Speed Intervention at heavy light chop but was not afforded
the opportunity. Pilot discretion with CASA Hwang was non existent.
3. BRIEFINGs: As though Korean Air needs more briefings and cockpit
chatter…. According to CASA Hwang I also didn't know that I was
supposed to brief the SMGS part of the 10-1P in Hong Kong . The
weather was CAVOK. CASA said I was supposed to brief the part about
the voluntary test program regarding the transponder being turned on.
He had a lengthy conversation about how it was negligent to omit this
fact. The fact is, the transponder was `on' the whole time we were on
the ground. As far as I know it is a test program and is not
mandatory. I may have missed briefing this on the departure although
I thought I had briefed leaving the transponder on during the arrival
briefing only an hour prior. It was in my notes.
4. TAXI at HONG KONG : My English is good. I am a native English
speaker. The taxi instructions were verified by LCP Captain Choi. No
other aircraft were on the taxiway going to 07R. Many hold short
instructions were given, then canceled and verified by us. CASA Hwang
said we went down the wrong taxi way because he thought he heard
ground control say we needed to change to another taxi way. I asked
them to get the voice tapes from Hong Kong if they thought this `non
critical event' was the reason for failing me on my check ride.
5. FATIGUE: CASA required me to do the walk around and the cockpit
FMC preparation with no time for rest. It was a 12 hour day with me
doing everything. EVERYTHING. Every minute was consumed with
updating the heading bug or some other `make work' event. It was not
a test of knowledge or your ability to fly an aircraft safely. It was
an ENDURANCE test. I am 56 years old. It would have been nice to
have been able to relax for a few minutes and collect my thoughts as
they were doing. Both CASA and the LCP had a break. No one works as
hard as I worked - even on an ocean crossing your maximum on duty time
is much less than 12 straight hours. The LCP did nothing too help.
He didn't even start the APU at the gate as though they were trying to
catch me unprepared for push back. (I caught the omission). I had to
command everything. I thought Boeing had designed this aircraft as a
two pilot aircraft. It was designed and built to require two
qualified pilots with the same objective to fly it. Not just a
captain trying to do everything by himself while the other one was
trying to resist and create an environment for mistakes. That would
be mutiny. Was he briefed to do this by CASA or does he do this on
every check ride? The conditions being created were unrealistic,
unsafe and unfair. I have never had a check ride like this in my life
anywhere. The goal of a check ride should be to fly safely to your
destination and assess the pilot's ability while doing it. I have
been an instructor and check airman for more than 3000 hours. I
learned very early in my career that as an instructor you can easily
create a situation which could cause a pilot to fail his check just by
distracting him from the task at hand. This is exactly what CASA
Hwang was doing. This check ride was the most bizarre sham I have ever
been through. It was not a legitimate evaluation.
Back Dating my TERMINATION: I attended a scheduled meeting on March
27, 2008 at 9:30 a.m. with OE Korean Air Chief Pilot Capt Kang.
Following the meeting he said they would have another meeting to
decide my fate. As soon as I walked out of the room with Capt Kang,
the man from administration, Mr. Shin met me and said he needed to
"out process" me. That was a quick meeting! Captain Kang already
knew I was terminated and still he told me that the decision had not
been made yet. It was a lie. "Saving face" must be a euphemism for
liars. Shin told me that they had terminated my contract effective
March 25th. How could that be? I was flying to Hong Kong on March
25th. After my CASA debriefing I was told by LCP Choi to go to the
meeting with Capt Kang on March 27. I even checked my schedule for
changes. There is a record of that. When Mr. Shin told me my
contract was canceled as of March 25, I told them that my contract was
still in force until I left Korea and that they would need to pay me
until March 28th, 2008 when I was scheduled to leave because I was
directed to turn in my uniforms and do other company business up until
the time I left Korea. I also told them they owed me per diem for
those days. When I said I was still an employee on those dates, he
corrected me and said I had never been an employee. He told me on two
separate occasions that I was a CONTRACT WORKER, NOT a Korean Air
employee. I also found out that they had refused to process my free
positive space business class passes from Korean Air that I am
rightfully entitled to since I was still employed at the time of the
request and those tickets are part of the agreement. They also
refused to process other ZED pass requests that I had put in on the
day of my check ride while I was still employed. I earned them the
hard way. I asked for 4 round trip tickets to Bangkok for my family
Eileen, Amelia and myself from Atlanta , Georgia and Mitchell (my son)
from San Francisco , CA . I expect to get them as well as the ZED
tickets that were requested - or be paid for their value. They
shouldn't be able to get out of this by "back dating" my employment.
I went to the Executive Offices: When Mr. Shin told me I had to `out
process' (after Captain Kong had said a decision had NOT been made and
that there would be a meeting) I felt so betrayed by their lies and
was so convinced the whole process was a sham that I immediately left
the room, walked down the hall and went straight up to the Executive
offices of Korean Air on the 7th Floor (above the medical clinic).
Someone at the top of this organization needs to know what is going on
in the Operations department. I went into the first executive office
on the right and told the gentleman in the office that I had an
emergency and I needed to speak with him. (I think he was the V.P. of
Human Resources although I did not get his name). I told him about
the corruption at CASA and the lies that CASA was telling in order to
fail pilots on their check rides. I used the failure rate on the
B-777 as proof that there was a clandestine plan to keep the B-777's
`parked'. After I delivered my message I was personally escorted from
his office back to operations to see Captain Lee. I intentionally did
not start with Captain Lee because the problem is under his control.
I went into his office and Captain Lee and his managers gathered
around me. As I told them the same details I had discussed in the
Executive Offices, some of his managers were laughing at me as though
my details were some kind of joke. I objected, which made them laugh
more. It seemed as though they took personal pleasure at my
irritation. Maybe they were just nervous about the facts.
SUMMARY: I have never studied so hard in all my life and come up so
short on anyone's performance expectations. I DON'T HAVE ANY PROBLEMS
FLYING THE AIRCRAFT. My problems stem from having to learn new
techniques that are being taught as procedures just to satisfy every
new instructor. They are techniques that have nothing to do with
operating an aircraft safely. I tried very hard. I stayed in my room
studying for 4 months straight trying to learn method # 1—49 wrong
ways. I didn't watch TV, or party. All I did was study and chair
fly. After the unfairness of my check ride I can only arrive at one
conclusion. CASA and the operations department is part of the
problem. I am not. Myself and the rest of my class that are no
longer at Korean Air tried our best to be part of the solution. From
my perspective, and the perspective of many others, you are risking
your professional reputation by accepting a position at Korean Air.
Misc Notes:
* As a Delta pilot for 22 years, Korean Air procedures bear very
little resemblance to Delta Procedures. They are completely
different. Even their FOM and POM bears little resemblance. For
instance, Delta Pilots only repeat critical changes to FMA status such
as "LOC capture", "Land 3" etc. and otherwise maintain a quiet sterile
cockpit concept below 10,000'. The constant Korean Air callouts of
FMA changes and constant cockpit response chatter such as "check" are
a distraction from flying. This breaches the quiet cockpit concept
and causes missed radio calls and jeopardize safety. There is
entirely too much cockpit chatter below 10,000. This is a very big
problem at Korean Air and a safety issue. I can hardly hear ATC
instructions over the F/O's chant of FMA changes and my required
responses of saying "check". It is very distracting.
* Fatigue. I worked too hard being required to do everything
(alone) for a 12 hour day.
* Techniques taught as procedure: (Example: constant update of
the heading bug – even to one degree.) You can't be expected to know
techniques without training.
* There is severely inadequate training at Korean Air. English
instructors are needed.
* Needless callouts for everything imaginable. "Check" is
overused and meaningless.
* Endless briefings of questionable value.
* Constant, needless ATIS updates.
* Required to MEMORIZE the POM, FOM, when it says in those books
that the only memory items should be Recall items and limitations.
* Requiring the Captain to do the F/O job of loading the FMC and
loading it with much more than required by Boeing - and then do the
walk around as well. Doing the Captains job as well as the first
officer's job – what is the point of this?
* Not abiding by FOM cockpit security rules and regulations.
* Not abiding by FOM oxygen requirements when one pilot leaves the
cockpit.
* Not abiding by FOM avoiding eating at the same time requirements.
* Treating every waypoint as compulsory.
* Korean Air spent time trying to build loyalty to their company
with the initial indoctrination program and then caused distrust and
even anger with the way we were treated in OE. All foreign Captains
can see what is happening to these pilots. Poor treatment by Korean
Air treatment instills mistrust and disdain in their workforce.
Blue Skies and good luck