Regarding techniques taught as "procedures": On my check ride I
learned of even more techniques that were taught as "procedures".
These were procedures that I had never heard of from my FIVE previous
Korean Air instructors. For instance:
1. FLAPS: On initial approach to Incheon Rwy 33R, in a critical
phase of flight, I learned you can't go from flaps UP directly to 5
degrees (skipping flaps 1), even if your airspeed allows it.
According to CASA you CAN'T select flaps 1 until you have SLOWED to
clean speed - in spite of the fact that Boeing allows it, and in spite
of the fact that I was approximately 6 miles from the FAF and ATC had
required me to maintain 230 kts to close a space in front of me. I
was already trying to slow down, I was descending ON GLIDE PATH WITH
FULL SPEED BRAKES and ATC had given me an overshooting turn across
fin al. I was trying to correct back to Localizer. During this same
time the CASA checker was verbally chastising me (below 10,000 sterile
cockpit) for calling flaps 5; I was thinking about "stabilized
approach criteria", FOQA, and CHECK RIDE all at the same time. I got
the aircraft stabilized by lowering the gear and going to flaps 20
after having to demand it, and trying to get the checklist completed
while they both were commenting in Korean (probably about my non
standard command for flaps) (no sterile cockpit below 10,000). I
should have just gone around for needless breach of sterile cockpit
rules below 10,000 and the unsafe distraction from the more important
task at hand. However, I also realized that if I had done a go
around, it would have been another reason for failing me on my check
ride. I know flying is dynamic. You MUST be able to adjust to the
situation you find yourself in and not be confined by some artificial
classroom fligh t technique being taught as procedure that have
absolutely no basis of reason from Boeing, (the manufacturer), nor are
those techniques based on logical or sound aerodynamic principals in
general, given the circumstances and phase of fli ght I was in.
Sometimes you need to look at the bigger picture. We only had 15
minutes of holding fuel. The next approach would have been minimum fuel.
2. TURBULENCE: I also found out that it is a procedure for LIGHT
turbulence that you must speed intervene and go to Mach .82. I just
thought that was for something more serious such as moderate
turbulence when your airspeed might actually be affected; I have
done plenty of speed interventions in my time, but never for light
turbulence. I had already placed the seat belt light on before they
said anything. CASA i ntervened and insisted I use `speed
intervention'. Five to Ten minutes after CASA intervened to tell me
to select Speed Intervention th e turbulence did eventually increase to
moderate. It could have just as easily disappeared. I would have
selected Speed Intervention at heavy light chop but was not afforded
the opportunity. Pilot discretion with CASA Hwang was non existent.
3. BRIEFINGs: As though Korean Air needs more briefings and cockpit
chatter…. According to CASA Hwang I also didn't know that I was
supposed to brief the SMGS part of the 10-1P in Hong Kong . The
weather was CAVOK. CASA said I was supposed to brief the part about
the voluntary test program regarding the transponder being turned on.
He had a lengthy conversation about how it was negligent to omit this
fact. The fact is, the transponder was `on' the whole time we were on
the ground. As far as I know it is a test program and is not
mandatory. I may have missed briefing this on the departure although
I thought I had briefed leaving the transponder on during the arrival
br iefing only an hour prior. It was in my notes.
4. TAXI at HONG KONG : My English is good. I am a native English
speaker. The taxi instructions were verified by LCP Captain Choi. No
other aircraft were on the taxiway going to 07R. Many hold short
instructions were given, then canceled and verified by us. CASA Hwang
said we went down the wrong taxi way because he thought he heard
ground control say we needed to change to another taxi way. I asked
them to get the voice tapes from Hong Kong if they thought this `non
critical event' was the reason for failing me on my check ride.
5. FATIGUE: CASA required me to do the walk around and the cockpit
FMC preparation with no time for rest. It was a 12 hour day with me
doing everything. EVERYTHING. Every minute was consumed with
updating the heading bug or some other `make work' event. It was not
a test of knowledge or your abili ty to fly an aircraft safely. It was
an ENDURANCE test. I am 56 years old. It would have been nice to
have be en able to relax for a few minutes and collect my thoughts as
they were doing. Both CASA and the LCP had a break. No one works as
hard as I worked - even on an ocean crossing your maximum on duty time
is much less than 12 straight hours. The LCP did nothing too help.
He didn't even start the APU at the gate as though they were trying to
catch me unprepared for push back. (I caught the omission). I had to
command everything. I thought Boeing had designed this aircraft as a
two pilot aircraft. I t was designed and built to require two
qualified pilots with the same objective to fly it. Not just a
captain trying to do everything by himself while the other one was
trying to resist and create an environment for mistakes. That would
be mutiny. Was he briefed to do this by CASA or does he do this on
every check ride? The conditions being cr eated were unrealistic,
unsafe and unfair. I have never had a check ride like this in my life
anywhere. The goal of a check ride should be to fly safely to your
destination and assess the pilot's ability while doing it. I have
been an instructor and check airman for more than 3000 hours. I
learned very early in my career that as an instr uctor you can easily
create a situation which could cause a pilot to fail his check just by
distracting him from the task at hand. This is exactly what CASA
Hwang was doing. This check ride was the most bizarre sham I have ever
been through. It was not a legitimate evaluation.
Back Dating my TERMINATION: I attended a scheduled meeting on March
27, 2008 at 9:30 a.m. with OE Korean Air Chief Pilot Capt Kang.
Following the meeting he said they would have another meeting to
decide my fate. As soon as I walked out of the room with Capt Kang,
the man from administrat ion, Mr. Shin met me and said he needed to< BR>"out process" me. That was a quick meeting! Captain Kang already
knew I was terminated and still he told me that the decision had not
been made yet. It was a lie. "Saving face" must be a euphemism for
liars. Shin told me that they had terminated my contract effective
March 25th. How could that be? I was flying to Hong Kong on March
25th. After my CASA debriefing I was told by LCP Choi to go to the
meeting with Capt Kang on March 27. I even checked my schedule for
changes. There is a record of that. When Mr. Shin told me my
contract was canceled as of March 25, I told them that my contract was
still in force until I left Korea and that they would need to pay me
until March 28th, 2008 when I was scheduled to leave because I was
directed to turn in my uniforms and do other company business up until
the time I left Korea. I also told them they owed me per diem for
those days. When I said I was still an employee on those dates, he
corrected me and said I had never been an employee. He told me on two
separate occasions that I was a CONTRACT WORKER, NOT a Korean Air
employee. I also found out that they had refused to process my free
positive space business class passes from Korean Air that I am
rightfully entitled to since I was still employed at the time of the
request and those tickets are part of the agreement. They also
refused to process other ZED pass requests that I had put in on the
day of my check ride while I was still employed. I earned them the
hard way. I asked for 4 round trip tickets to Bangkok for my family
Eileen, Amelia and myself from Atlanta , Georgia and Mitchell (my son)
from San Francisco , CA . I expect to g et them as well as the ZED
tickets that were requested - or be paid for their value. They
shouldn't be able to get out of this by "back dating" my employment.
I went to the Executive Offices: When Mr. Shin told me I had to `out
process' (after Captain Kong had said a decision had NOT been made and
that there would be a meeting) I felt so betrayed by their lies and
was so convinced the whole process was a sham that I immediately left
the room, walked down the hall and went straight up to the Executive
offices of Korean Air on the 7th Floor (above the medical clinic).
Someone at the top of this organization needs to know what is going on
in the Operations department. I went into the first executive office
on the right and told the gentle man in the office that I had an
emergency and I needed to speak with him. (I think he was the V.P. of
Human Resources although I did not get his name). I told him about
the corruption at CASA and the lies that CASA was telling in order to
fail pilots on their check rides. I used the failure rate on the
B-777 as proof that there was a clandestine plan to keep the B-777's
`parked'. After I delivered my m essage I was personally escorted from
his office back to operations to see Captain Lee. I intentionally did
not start with Captain Lee because the problem is under his control.
I went into his office and Captain Lee and his managers gathered
around me. As I told them the same details I had discussed in the
Executive Offices, some of his managers were laughing at me as though
my details were some kind of joke. I objected, which made them laugh
more. It seemed as though they took personal pleasure at my
irritation. Maybe they were just nervous about the facts.
SUMMARY: I have never studied so hard in all my life and come up so
short on anyone's performance expectations. I DON'T HAVE ANY PROBLEMS
FLYING THE AIRCRAFT. My problems stem from having to learn new
techniques that are being taught as procedures just to satisfy every
new instructor. They are techniques that have nothing to do with
operating an aircraft safely. I tried very hard. I stayed in my room
studying for 4 months straight trying to learn method # 1—49 wrong
ways. I didn't watch TV, or party. All I did was study and chair
fly. After the unfairness of my check ride I can only arrive at one
conclusion. CASA and the operations department is part of the
problem. I am not. Mys elf and the rest of my class that are no
longer at Korean Air tried our best to be part of the solution. From
my perspective, and the perspective of many others, you are risking
your professional reputation by accepting a position at Korean Air.
Misc Notes:
* As a Delta pilot for 22 years, Korean Air procedures bear very
little resemblance to Delta Procedures. They are completely
different. Even their FOM and POM bears little resemblance. For
instance, Delta Pilots only repeat critical changes to FMA status such
as "LOC capture", "Land 3" etc. and otherwise maintain a quiet sterile
cockpit concept below 10,000'. The constant Korean Air callouts of
FMA changes and constant cockpit response chatter such as "check" are
a distraction from flying. This breaches the quiet cockpit concept
and causes missed radio calls and jeopardize safety. There is
entirely too much cockpit chatter below 10,000. This is a very big
problem at Korean Air and a safety issue. I can hardly hear ATC
instructions over the F/O's chant of FMA changes and my required
responses of saying "check". It is very distracting.
* Fatigue. I worked too hard being required to do everything
(alone) for a 12 ho ur day.
* Techniques taught a s procedure: (Example: constant update of
the heading bug – even to one degree.) You can't be expected to know
techniques without training.
* There is severely inadequate training at Korean Air. English
instructors are needed.
* Needless callouts for everything imaginable. "Check" is
overused and meaningless.
* Endless briefings of questionable value.
* Constant, needless ATIS updates.
* Required to MEMORIZE the POM, FOM, when it says in those books
that the only memory items should be Recall items and limitations.
* Requiring the Captain to do the F/O job of loading the FMC and
loading it with much more than required by Boeing - and then do the
walk around as well. Doing the Captains job as well as the first
officer's job – what is the point of this?
* Not abiding by FOM cockpit security rules and regulations.
* Not abiding by FOM oxygen requirements when one pilot leaves the
cockpit.
* Not abi ding by FOM avoiding eating at the same time requirements.
* Treating every waypoint as compulsory.
* Korean Air spent time trying to build loyalty to their company
with the initial indoctrination program and then caused distrust and
eve n anger with the way we were treated in OE. All foreign Captains
can see what is happening to these pilots. Poor treatment by Korean
Air treatment instills mistrust and disdain in their workforce.
Blue Skies and good luck
**name removed**
Last edited by KC135777; 1st May 2008 at 15:12.