Quote:
Bottom line: while the SCP system might be safe, as a standalone system, it cannot be used due to the unsafe nature of the crossfeed pipe, when open, in most circumstances.
Ed
Interesting. I take back my initial assumption that the SCP design when embodied was safe. It appears that while not perhaps overtly unsafe, some features of its implementation/operation did include some significant potential safety shortcomings/risks from day 1 that should at least have been recognised.
Two good posts. Well said. What we're talking about here is, in essence, the difference between Physical and Functional Safety, a basic component of Systems Engineering.
As I've said before, I didn't agree with my 2* (x2) and 4* ruling that the latter was optional. And I don't believe successive Mins(AF) should have been advised to uphold the rulings.
It is one thing to inadvertently miss something like this in a complex system design - but quite a different thing altogether to make a deliberate decision to leave a design functionally unsafe and teach staff (and industry) that it's ok and they will be rewarded for doing so.
So, when the QC looks into the FACT that airworthiness regs weren't implemented properly, I hope he starts at this level of "management", as their rulings set the tone. All too often these things start at the bottom and come to a sudden halt when a scapegoat can be found.