Originally Posted by
G-EMMA
moggiee If you can find me one published report that in any way points the finger I will change my view.
Try the Kegworth 737 for a start - everyone gets a share of blame there. Then there's Tim Lancaster's BAC1-11 spacewalk (window blew out because the engineer used the wrong bolts) and the Staines Trident where the crew retracted the leading edge flaps when they should have brought up the trailing edge devices.
In all three cases the causes were HUMAN ERROR and as such, human error is directly attributable to an individual or individuals. When an investigation says that a particular individual has made a mistake, that IS apportioning blame - it can be no other way. Those individuals may not be punished (that's a different issue) but if the report says that people X, Y and Z made mistakes then that is blame being apportioned.
There are plenty of others - but you will no doubt disagree on some tiny of semantics and nitpicking detail, rather than looking at the broader picture.
By the way, I have been one of those individuals who has been a factor in an incident (but not accident) and have no problem with taking a share of the blame. In my case I was a contributory factor in an incident on a long haul airliner on which I was FO, an error of omission in this case. I did not stop the Captain and Flt Eng breaking the rules (getting airborne with a tech fault and VERY nearly causing the aeroplane to crash) and I take my share of the blame and tell people about it in the hope that they may learn from my mistake. It is a failure to accept responsibility for your errors or even to accept that you could be wrong that is a problem. The Kegworth chaps don't accept that they made mistakes - so are unlikely to learn from them. I accept that I have made mistakes in an aeroplane and endeavour to learn from this.
Learning from mistakes is what the AAIB "mission statement" is about.
Mind you, I can't see you changing your mind as promised - that's not your style, is it? You prefer to nit pick a turn of phrase such as "dim view" when the intent in that phrase was perfectly clear.
The CAA on the other hand might, but I would like to see a report or prosecution relating to a light aircraft in the UK that cites the use of a non-approved check list as causal or contributing factor in either an accident or prosecution.
That wasn't/isn't the point at issue - you have combined 2 or 3 separate points to narrow a discussion down to such a level that you can use an exception to attempt to prove your rule! The CAA prosecute when they feel it's needed (although not as often as they should). Those prosecutions tackle human factors transgressions and as such are pointing the finger at people who have been found (by investigations) to have broken the rules.
With regard to the POH, as stated by others it may not be perfect but it is the best info that we have. It gives something to work with and, therefore, is ignored at the users peril. Safety factors built in should allow for age as long as maintenance is up to scratch - and whilst the odd genuine accident does occur (where a component failure was beyond anybody's control), the vast majority of accidents are human factor failings which could have been avoided by proper planning, decent decision making and adherence to rules and procedures.