Great debate. We need more but please, if we are to get things right then we need to
1. Iron out misunderstandings
2. Correct misconceptions
3. Identify and correct procedures that are inappropriate
4. Ensure the documentation supports the above in a timely fashion.
How do we do that? My recommendation is sustained pressure either through the OEM's channels or through your local aviation authority channels (CAA, FAA etc). Unilateral action may plug a gap but if you remember the Airbus Accident in NY just after 911 they found that the clever-clogs at the sim centre had been teaching the guys to 'pick-up' a 'turbulance induced dropped wing' with rudder. They thought they were doing the right thing when all along it turned out to be the wrong thing and it killed a bunch of people. The OEM knew what was right but poorly communicated it to the guys at the sharp end.
Floats do not get armed during an approach a bunch of times - remember I've been there and I know how the real world works. The probability is that during a hurried approach that is complicated by other factors - at night - and we are then in the 'zone' that auto-floats were designed for.
I could go on but risk boring you. Remember that I don't work for the OEM and anyway am so far down the pecking order that what I say seemingly has little if any effect. Ask the 7 crews (so far!) that have slavishly followed the checklist after Double Gen fail (at night and or IMC) and have then switched off the Batt Mast instead of the Batt Main. OOps - at night = very tricky and IMC = YOU'RE DEAD. The checklist should read Main Batt not Batt Main but can I get it changed? Well it's been a year now and nothing yet despite repeated reports up the chain.
Now all I can do is shine a light in the right direction - you guys have to get vocal and get some changes made, not sit around dreaming up fixes that might just be your version of the Airbus drama mentioned above.
G
