Geoff
With regard to the change in arming the floats procedure, neither Pitchlink nor I had anything to do with it. That said I'm still not convinced what we are doing is so criminal.
If your counter is that we will be ripped apart at the subsequent inquiry that’s one thing. My response would be we are doing as our company check list requires, so our normal procedure supersedes the normal procedure in the RFM. The company have addressed the perceived problem and formed a policy. To what extent the Authority have been involved I'm not aware.
I'm more interested in why you are so sure the floats won't inflate in flight from a technical point of view.
You ask me
"Do you think this possibility wasn't covered in the design/certification process?"
My thoughts are that clearly not everything has been well thought out, yet still certified. As Pitchlink points out there is a blooper in the certified RFM with regard to one fire drill. Should we just follow the drill and run from the flames?
How the search light was 'certified' is a mystery to me. It is completely useless to the RHP when landing at night on an offshore platform! It's a joke. All it does is cast a shadow of the nose gear over the deck. Add to that that you need a vvvvvery long thumb to reach the switch while operating the FTR collective trigger switch. It becomes more of a distraction and a hazard than an aid. I tend not to bother with it any more. It is better from the left seat. That is my pet hate, but it has been certified. Ask other 139 pilots what bothers them and you may be surprised buy the length of the list. All certified but still leaving people scratching their heads.
Tell me, how did a design of escape window pass certification and then need a speedy modification following the loss of one in flight? The subsequent modification, which must also have been certified, was then proven to fail to jettison when tested on more than one airframe (modified by the manufacturer). Now having been modified again, I have been lead to believe, two have ‘departed’ in flight again.
Read the JAR requirements for an AVAD and then think of how poorly the 139 complies. Yes, it passed certification but only by the thickness of a comma. I believe it offers poor protection for offshore ops. Imagine in a dark cockpit with the Aural Warning Regrade switch inadvertently (Why no CAS warning or advisory!!!
) in the wrong position. Now no 150 ft call and no Check Height! Just a little black box subsequently filled with the letters MIN at DH. Geoff, I know you see where I’m going on this one.
My point is that just because it was certified doesn't mean it is right. We all know of examples of aircraft which following certification - and all that that requires - that have had to be modified once being shaken down in service.
Someone still needs to explain to me in simple talk why this is such a safe system that it should be armed in the cruise.
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Everybody - well nearly everybody, wants AFDS. There seems little point in having it if you don't trust it and use it.
I agree, but the AFDS I’m used to allows the pilot to arm the AFDS system at the appropriate speed/time when should there be a fault and the floats pop there and then, then the consequences should not be catastrophic. Why have the floats armed at 2000/3000 ft MSL for 120 Nm at 155kts?
With regard to my little teaser, from memory try the basic RFM, limitations for ventilation.
ATB
Red