Pitchlink.
The point I am making is not that any OEM's docs are perfect and yes ours are behind the game when it comes to catching up with glitches, typos and foul-ups. I recommend caution when dealing with these things. For example is the statement in the RFM Supp ref Float Operation policy a 'mistake'? Clearly not. This 'policy' was carried over from other previous types and may even be a function of the certification process. If you, as an individual aircraft commander decide unilaterally, to operate a different policy then I believe you are standing into danger. I venture to suggest that you may not survive the
'in the subsequent enquiry test'.
If you spot a mistake in any procedure or you believe it is inadequate or inappropriate you must bring it to the notice of your superiors - preferably in writing - and even complete an MOR or equivalent Air Safety Report. They should notify their local Aviation Authority and or the OEM.
I know it's tough when you want to change NOW but beware doing it in any way that exposes you to difficulties if it all goes pear-shaped on you.
I have had some colleagues of mine who have been decimated in the witness box by barristers who can put you on the spot with statements like '
So tell me Captain Smithers, are you telling this inquiry that you know better than the people who designed, developed, tested and certified this helicopter and specifically stated that this procedure must be followed'.
Not impossible to get out of but you really don't want to be in that situation if you can avoid it.
Red
My point is that these are just 'simple electrical functions' which now have computerised rocket science driving them. In the old technology a switch was a connection to a power source not a signal to a computer to commence a series of logic functions and finally to remotely operate the bit you wanted. So why not the possibility of a mis-signal to fire the floats, if armed, in flight?
Do you think this possibility wasn't covered in the design/cerification process?
I'm starting to sound like a ludite, and I don't mean to. We are moving in the right direction. But just because it's new doesn't necessarily mean its better and the old way is pants. If there is a remote (10 to the power of nine or whatever) chance of deployment in flight, why not reduce it further by isolating the circuit? If the crew are not in a position to 'arm as required' my feeling is that the floats may not save the day anyway.
Everybody - well nearly everybody, wants AFDS. There seems little point in having it if you don't trust it and use it. I'm sure we can find some examples in the statistics where such a system either did save the day or would have saved the day - can anybody out there point out any specific ones?
If we revert to the old methods we negate the potential for saving our skins one day. Lets FIX IT so we can USE IT.
Now Geoffers, you baited your hook well and reeled in a good sized fish. So I will cast a wee tempter back towards you.
When converting guys/girls onto the 139 do you ensure that they have the fwd vent running (heater off) or they have a DV window (tricky in the sim) open when MPOG/HIGE/HOGE in wind speeds less than 25 knts?
Honest answers only now.
My Get Out of Jail Free Card is quite simple. The TR course is designed around the basic aircraft and we do not include Customer Specified Equipment (if it needs a Supp to the RFM then its CSE). We don't cover use of the heater. Pathetic but true, I can't even find the reference you are talking about in my electronic copies of the RFM or the QRH. Where can I find it?
I'm a great believer in PPrunes ability to air and resolve these topics. The more the merrier, keep them coming and we will all get to learn something.
G
