Davejb
you can only base your decisions on what you've been told and the documentation for the aircraft. It is those who DID have the information, but failed to pass it on or correctly interpret it, that I believe accountable.
This is absolutely correct, and goes to the heart of the issue; with one caveat – the application of engineering judgement, knowledge and good practice; all of which feature heavily in MoD rules covering decision making and delegation of authority.
The trouble is, of course, when someone declares he doesn’t need engineers in posts requiring daily engineering decisions affecting safety and airworthiness, and he’s getting rid of a vast proportion of them from the very department you, at the front line, depend on for continuity and support. I speak, of course, of CDP’s lunatic decision in 1996.
His ruling is a matter of record – I disagree with it. The safety risks were advised and they have come to pass. However, don’t think I’ve got a downer on just one man. This decision was just one of a long line of anti-engineer policies introduced in the 90s, commencing some years before when RAF suppliers at Harrogate were given control of support funding and permitted, nay encouraged, to over-rule engineering decisions to the detriment of flight safety. The first thing they did was slash funding to maintain the build standard (which includes maintaining safety). Their 2 Star threatened dismissal for those engineers who complained. In fact, at one point a ruling was made that ANY admin grade was senior to ANY engineer. A young lady supply manager about 3 grades below me was appointed as my line manager! That lasted about a week (much to her relief), but illustrates the mentality.
Having correct and up to date documentation (APs for example) is an important part of Maintaining the Build Standard, and hence airworthiness. A point I think I may have made before (which absolutely no-one comments on). I’ve demonstrated that knowing the current build standard is a mandated requirement (as it must be detailed in the Hazard Log), yet broad MoD practice is NOT to maintain it. What process, procedures and regulations cover this? Are they implemented properly? No – that is the reason why the Government has accepted liability.
Finally, I never criticise BAeS on this thread. On the face of it, there have been lapses, but you must always remember two things;
- The design is Under Ministry Control (UMC). Read the Def Stan.
- It is therefore the responsibility (duty) of MoD to ensure their appointed Aircraft Design Authority, and all vendor DAs and DCs, are under continuous contract in accordance with the Def Stan. Ant break or reduction in level of cover almost automatically breaks the airworthiness audit trail.
And, preferably, the ADA must have a degree of contractual control over the actions of all other DAs/DCs – including Service DAs who design and embody Service Engineered Mods. This procedure is also laid down in a Def Stan (which at a rough guess about 4 people in MoD could quote).
So, I hesitate to point the finger until I know the answers to these questions. Perhaps Des Browne was briefed properly for a change, and the key is in his admission?