WEBF,
In the hope of stimulating some debate...
Tillman's book is an excellent book, but skewed to a fighter pilots view of how a campaign should have been fought. For a better strategic overview read US Grant Sharp's book, "Strategy for Defeat".
IMHO the arguements for and against the effect of airpower in VN are finely balanced, and designed to underline the viewpoints of a their protagonists. My conclusions are thus:
1. The USAF was obsessed with the "big one" and only grudgingly accepted the Spad, SLUF et al into the inventory when it became obvious that the OrBat was wrong for SEA (when, if ever, will we come to the same opinion...)
2. Basic rules of war were ignored. "Gradualism" seemed a RANDesque construct that had/has little place in the tenets of war; It is difficult to "send messages" whilst bombing a country, particularly when youe refrain from hitting vital infrastructure (Haiphong, Phuc Yen, SAM sites, Dams etc) for fear of widening the war.
3. The VN war was the first "Long Screwdriver" War. To paraphrase, "War is too important to be left to politically motivated individuals"
4. The desire for all branches of the US military to be seen to be important, wary of losing their slice of the pie.
I would also take issue with the Janes synoposis. The rapid defeat of 1975 was hastened by the restrictions imposed upon US Air Power by a anti-war Congress / Senate who prevented Ford from launching strikes to support the SVN state or by providing the required weaponry (as they had to Israel) to stop the NVN Armour (note that the 1971 use of NVN armour had been repelled by TOW missiles, many fired by AH-1s). The ARVN was organised along unit v unit lines, it was just not very good at it.