To be honest, I was surprised by the lack of replies. This was not intended as another carrier thread, but one relating to over restrictive Rules of Engagement and political micro-management. Nor was it intended to be about fighters and ACM, although the need for ACM practice and aircraft guns is the lesson that needs to be remembered.
The idea that the war in Vietnam was winnable seems to fly in the face of the widely held view that it was unwinnable, but it is certainly worth thinking about. Similarly the Rules of Engagement issue. I remember watching the Bosnian conflict for years on TV, and hearing (and I've heard a lot more since) of how the efforts by NATO to use airpower was frustrated by UN officials on many occasions. It was only when the UN was removed from the decision making process that NATO was able to bring the genocide to an end. Operation
Deliberate Force showed that air power can be an extremely powerful instrument. Operations over Kosovo were less successful, partly (in my view) because the Serbs did not believe NATO would be serious about mounting a ground invasion.
The role of the US Navy in Vietnam is often forgotten. Apart from carriers launching strikes and the riverine forces, the role of US warships is often overlooked. Yet amphibious operations and naval gunfire support were key parts of US operations. On a number of occasions US warships shot MiGs down. Inevitably they took losses.
Today, US and UK forces are committed to two theatres, one all but land locked, the other totally landlocked. But naval forces contribute to both operations, a fact frequently forgotten. The next theatre will almost certainly not be landlocked, may well have an extensive coastline, and may even have air force or a navy. Yet many assume that all future operations will be in landlocked places, because Afghanistan is. Nichols and Tillman comment on the tendency of planners to assume that the next conflict will be the same as the last.
I think this a good time to include a link to an article from
Janes.
Opinion - Asymmetry and other fables
Guerrilla warfare is also hardly new and can be defeated by forcing the guerrillas to fight on unfavourable terms - asymmetrically. The South African Army, for example, used mechanised forces against guerrilla bases in Angola and light mechanised forces to track and defeat those guerrillas who did get across the border.
The reverse side saw South Vietnam conquered by conventional North Vietnamese forces of armour, infantry and artillery that rolled over the South Vietnamese Army without much difficulty. They were able to do so because the south was organised and armed primarily for operations against guerrillas. This is asymmetry at work.