EdSett. Apologies for not responding sooner.
Mick Smith, I urge you or your colleagues to pm me whenever you want to write anything in the Timesonline about anything technical on this aircraft. Helgar is clearly concerned about what has been written. This is yet another needless discussion.
Thanks for the offer. I took the issues to the MoD three days before the article appeared and was told they couldnt answer them in detail because of the independent inquiry. Your comments would have no doubt informed the article. BUT...
I was reporting what the QinetiQ engineers said was the case and it isnt a needless discussion. It's a very important discussion, not least because the QinetiQ engineers who wrote the report saw it as so important that they said the following recommendation needed to be carried through before the aircraft was ALARP:
Further consideration should be given to the AAR procedures to ensure that tank 5 does not suffer from over-pressurisation, including reinstatement of the tank 5 over pressurisation warning
I now look forward to the flow rate explanation. For the record, the QinetiQ engineers said:
FRS Couplings. It is noted that the maximum permissible flow rate for type /N is 1,052.7 kg/min. Flow rates during AAR have been measured at 2,100 kg/min. It is therefore recommended that assurance is sought that FRS couplings are suitable for use in the Nimrod fuel system for the purpose of AAR given that measured flow rates have been seen at approximately double the qualified flow rates of the FRS coupling.
They also said:
There no longer exists an in-depth knowledge of working on the Nimrod aircraft within NLS and it is not unusual for tradesmen when faced with something that they have never undertaken before to seek advice and support from other areas at Kinloss, FSS are able to provide support but NLS also seek help from FRA on an unofficial 'old boy' approach.
and
Human errors are more likely to occur where experience and manning levels are low. The combination of these factors creates additional tensions and uncertainties. At Kinloss there have been examples of poor practice or human errors occurring which might otherwise have been avoided.
I should stress having re-read my post that the last two quotes are not meant to be a snipe at you, your comments are always useful, only reinforcing the point that, along with the overstatement of the state of risk involved with the fuel system, this was not exactly the ringing endorsement Des Browne painted it as.
[Edited to add final paragraph]