Another gem from MoD archives……..
“Pre-requisites to Successful safety Management”
Successful Safety Management requires (MoD) to follow good practices in areas such as;
- Quality (How many resident QARs do we have now?)
- Configuration Management (Funding slashed from 1991-on and now considered a vague concept and, at worst, a “waste of money”).
- Use of suitably qualified and experienced personnel (Difficult, following CDP’s decision in 1996 that such people were not required. He ditched two generations and left us with airfix pilots and physiologists making engineering decisions).
- Management of Corporate and Project Risk (Corporate are on the greasy pole and Projects are denied resources).
- Design Reviews (Ah, a hobby horse of mine, ever since 2* ruled it ok to waive a Critical Design Review knowing critical safety risks were outstanding. Luckily, I ignored him).
- Independent Review (Despite QQ not being truly independent, I have the greatest respect for the likes of Boscombe Down who, consistently, over a long period, have provided what stability and common sense there is in aircraft Safety Management. To paraphrase Beagle, if their recommendations are ignored it should be mandatory for the IPTL to document his/her reasons. I utterly detested being told to ignore them when their recommendations caused embarrassment to my boss’s mate. But, equally, I was disappointed when they withdrew under pressure only to phone me up and say “We were told to withdraw, but can you please make the aircraft safe?”).
- Closed Loop problem reporting and resolution (Closed, in the sense if you report a problem, the door is closed. If you’re on the outside, you’re ignored. If you’re on the inside, you’re on the carpet for a career brief on your brief career).
- Focus on Safety culture (In that the Safety and Risk managers are treated as a nasty culture festering in the corner of the floorplate).
Cynical, moi?