I have recently been reading
On Yankee Station by the late Cdr John B Nichols USN (Rtd) and Barret Tillman, published by the Naval Institute Press, about the US Naval air war over Vietnam. I think there are things from this book that are worth mentioning as the lessons apply to current operations in the Middle East, as well as future operations.
The book starts with an introduction to US carrier doctrine of the Vietnam era, including lessons and experiences from Korea and the stand off with Castro's Cuba. They then go straight into the difficult subject of Rules of Engagement, commenting on how much control the political leaders placed upon the military, frequently for fear of harming Soviet or Chinese advisors. Did the USSR or China show such concern for US personnel? For example, they comment that the North Vietnamese fighter airfields were left intact, for fear of harming advisors, and speculate on a possible MiG attack against US ships. Indeed they speculate that the reason such attacks did not occur was so that their airfields were left alone. Likewise they comment on the rules regarding SAM sites, and often AAA, being left untouched until they became active. They comment on how Chinese and sometimes Russian merchantmen offered AAA to US aircraft without fear of retaliation. The strict ROE regarding shipping is discussed, as is the failure to hit the docks at Haiphong. They then go on to discuss how the policy makers in Washington dictated over types of weapons that could or couldn't be used up North, such as napalm or cluster bombs, or even the size of bomb. Even more incredibly, they mention that even things such as the approach to hitting bridges was dictated by Washington.
Morale is briefly discussed, as is the desire by bean counters to stop Combat SAR operations on cost grounds. The book then discusses the surface threats from AAA and SAMs, before discussing the fighter actions against the MiGs. This is an interesting chapter as it discusses the F4 community, with their focus on long range missile engagements, vis a vis the F8 community with Sidewinder and cannon. It mkes the point that ACM is still needed, and that this something that needs constant practice. ECM aspects of the air war are discussed, something of particular interest, before discussing CV based strike operations in general, noting the importance of the skills of the deck crews, and the level of teamwork required in the air. SAR operations are mentioned, particularly with regard the the US Services taking time to develop robust combat SAR capabilities.
Finally, the authors ask "what if", commenting that it is a myth that tactical airpower failed, but was misued. The speculate that Haiphong harbour had been mined at an earlier stage of the war, it would have had a salutory effect on reducing the flow of supplies, going a long way to blunting the Communist war effort. When it was finally mined, the effects were significant. They then argue that an amphibious landing
north of the DMZ would have changed the course of the war. They state that the policy of "no wider war" precluded the use of wider, and potentially war winning, naval assets. Personally I cannot help wondering what would have happened, if US submarines had made there presence known in that part of the world, would the merchant vessels have been so keen to take shiploads of war materials to Haiphong? The idea that the war was winnable is a controversial, but fascinating, one.
The book concludes with some recommendations, mostly about the need for ACM practice, the desire for a high/low mix with a low cost pure fighter, and the need for mechanisms for lessons to be learnt. It also includes the following paragraph:
In short, an air force - especially a naval air force - is a fragile weapon. It must be constantly exercised - maintained at a high state of operational readiness with a uniformly high skill level.
I refer to the Royal Navy's own problems regarding carrier aviation, as discussed on the
Sea Jet and
Future Carrier threads.
See the offical USN history of the war in Indochina.
This link relates to an air attack on the USS
Oklahoma City. Not much has been written about air attacks on US vessels off of Vietnam, but I believe some did occur.
I think many of these lessons still apply today. Political meddling in military affairs is still a problem.