Future of BAA hearing
gonebutnotforgotten picked up on my post #692 and I think asked in post #776 what was the date of the Transport Ctee hearing that Stephen Nelson attended. It was 28th November 2007.
Before him the airlines had had a chance to give their opinions on poor BAA service and unresponsive management. Some of those interchanges may be worth rereading :
Q152 Chairman: In what sense, numbers of staff, the training of staff, how precisely? I must have, I think, some clear indication of what the problems are.
Dr Ellis: The numbers of staff, particularly staff who can be called upon at short notice to beef up the arrangements. In British Airways, for example, we have staff who are prepared to come into the front line when there is disruption and I think there is a need for those types of provisions to be made within BAA. Clearly, we need a more flexible arrangement in terms of the infrastructure within the terminals to be able to expand the provision of lanes and bring additional equipment into use should the need arise.
Q169 Mr Wilshire: Our witnesses are three amongst probably hundreds of thousands of people who had good reason to moan about things, particularly at Heathrow. Could you tell us something about how you have found engaging with BAA to discuss those problems and what impact you have been able to have on getting things improved?
Dr Ellis: I will take the lead on this one. Under the auspices of the CAA there has been a process called "constructive engagement" between the airlines and BAA, both at Heathrow and at Gatwick. That has led to a richer sharing of information in some areas. In some aspects of the capital programme, for example, we are doing better on those. However, we are now at a point in the regulatory process where we can see that some of the investments we felt had been agreed through the constructive engagement process are now being reviewed and rolled back when it actually comes to the crunch in terms of the triggers which are being put on those investments and the reward that would flow to BAA. So we are part-way through a process. We have yet to see whether it actually produces the goods because with constructive engagement we can only in the end determine its success when we see delivery on the ground.
Mr Langford: May I say, in terms of on the ground operationally, I believe that over the past few years BAA has actually been less responsive to operational issues. I believe we had much more coordination with BAA and with the leadership at the airport terminals to handle operational issues and forecasting problems. I believe the focus has gone away from that and I do believe there needs to be some significant improvement in those areas.
Q170 Mr Wilshire: Before Mr Nicol answers, could I ask you when you noticed that change and why you think it happened?
Mr Langford: On the first part of the question, I would say over the past few years our access to senior leadership and our regular operational coordination has certainly deteriorated. I cannot comment as to why, but a number of people have departed BAA and their successors have not re-established those operational links as we had in the past.
Q185 Mr Scott: I have a brief question for all of the witnesses. Security is paramount. The most important thing for any passenger is now their security in travelling on airlines. You have said that there are problems with queues, et cetera, at all of the airports. Can you tell me of any experiences elsewhere in the world where they have got a much more successful way of dealing with this?
Mr Nicol: What we noticed after 10 August last year was that most airports very quickly—this is within the European sphere within which easyJet operates—got back to business. Luton Airport, which is sort of broadly comparable in size to Stansted, was back operating at a similar level to previously very quickly. What we noticed was that it was only the BAA airports which we operate from, Gatwick and Stansted (Stansted in particular) where there appeared to be problems.
Mr Langford: I have to say Manchester Airport responded, again, much more quickly and much more fully, and they were able to get back to business much more easily and there is a great deal more collaboration and information-sharing in Manchester, we found, than we had in the BAA airports.
Q200 Mr Leech: Mr Langford, you had pointed out that Manchester had dealt with issues surrounding security far better than BAA. What lessons do the three of you believe could be learned from Manchester, or is Manchester just a poor comparison with the BAA airports?
Mr Langford: Strictly from my own point of view, being an operator in Manchester, we found that the reaction time was much quicker in Manchester, that there was much more engagement much more quickly, much more information was shared.
Q201 Mr Leech: What is the reason for that?
Mr Langford: Their management structure, their management point of view. They are used to operating in that manner. My manager in Manchester is very close to the operating people and the senior people at Manchester Airport, which is less true of the London airports. I spoke about security and I spoke about efficiency. The line is open at five o'clock in the morning, for example. People show up very early because they hear about the problems at Heathrow. If there are not enough lines open at 5.00 am queues start to build up. Queues then attract other queues and your whole day has a problem due to a small miscalculation at five o'clock in the morning. The people at Manchester, we found, do not make those mistakes and they are much more constant in having people available at 5.00 am, and the day runs well. At Heathrow you tend to be on the back foot