AlltheN, Widger, et al.
The fact that you have to go back to 1982 to illustrate the military need for a carrier tells the story.
In those days, with that budget, I was a huge supporter of carriers.
But today, we live in a different world.
LO,
A P-8 might cost less to operate, though given Boeing's record on the Wedgetail and KC-767, I'd hesitate before viewing it as being low risk. Nor does a twin-fan airliner fill me with confidence for a role which requires the platform to get down and dirty, manoeuvring quite hard as it flies the ASW cloverleafs, prosecuting an attack with torpedoes, etc.
Back to the Nimrod.....
When having information in the public domain would aid an enemy, then plainly, the public’s right to know MUST be subordinate to military secrecy. On this basis, I’d be nervous about seeing in print any detailed information relating to current deployments, tactics, and weapons and sensor system parametrics.
However, a culture of secrecy has grown up that treats all information with equal caution, historic, or current, operational or relating to procurement. That’s something I’m less anguine about.
Often, especially in the procurement field, such secrecy actually serves to damage our armed forces more deeply and more fundamentally than would revealing which squadron is presently based at (say) Kandahar with x number of jets. And I’d suggest that keeping Nimrod MRA4’s problems under wraps is a good example of damaging secrecy – whose only purpose can be to protect the contractor (whose reputation might be damaged by revelations about all the cock-ups), and to protect the reputations of the politicians and senior officers on whose watch these problems have occurred.
There is no doubt that there have been problems!
Air Staff Requirement Number 420 was issued, initially calling for 25 Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft with an In Service Date of 2003.
On 27” July 1996 the decision to award the contract to British Aerospace, was announced. The contract, now for only 21 aircraft and worth just over two billion pounds sterling, was eventually signed with British Aerospace on 2”d December 1996.
When the Nimrod MRA4 contract was let with BAE Systems in December 1996 the In-Service Date (ISD) was still set at April 2003. That ISD was defined as the date when seven aircraft were to be fully operational. The twenty-first and final aircraft was to be delivered to the Royal Air Force in 2006.
(So why did they call it Nimrod 2000?)
BAE Systems advised the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) that they could not meet this date in late 1998, following technical and resource problems.
The Nimrod MRA4 was identified as one of the Smart Procurement Initiative's pilot Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) in November 1998 - led by Air Commodore Barry Thornton, who was succeeded by Mr David King in January 2001 as IPT Leader. This meant that MRA4 became headlined as the flagship of SMART procurement – an irony in view of what was to happen.
The contract was ‘re-baselined’ In May 1999, following extensive negotiations, and a new ISD of March 2005 was set. This represented a delay of 23 months. The new In Service Date (ISD) of March 2005 was defined as being marked by the delivery of the 7th aircraft. The Nimrod MRA4 was due to enter operational service in August 2004 (this was NOT the ISD) and the 21st and final aircraft was due for delivery in December 2008.
A further change to the contract was agreed in 2001/02, including a two-stage capability demonstration prior to ISD. (“To mitigate this risk, MOD and BAE SYSTEMS have agreed to an Incremental Capability Acquisition approach. This comprises the acceptance of aircraft in two steps, an initial capability being demonstrated by the time of first aircraft delivery will full specification compliance being demonstrated by the time of the seventh aircraft delivery and ISD.”) It was then recognised that the ISD might prove to be late 2005.
The number of aircraft required was reduced to 18 in view of the assessed increase in capability and availability of the MRA4 over the MR2, and citing a perceived reduction in the submarine threat – or was the reduced number of aircraft, at the same overall cost, actually intended to compensate industry?
By the end of 2002, it was clear that the overlap of development and production activities was leading to further timescale problems. In February 2003 BAE SYSTEMS and MoD agreed to revise the programme again, aiming to reduce risk in development by delaying production work, allowing the design of the aircraft is proven during the flight trials programme. Once an acceptable level of demonstrated performance was achieved, the series production of the remaining 15 aircraft would recommence. This restructuring of the programme would result in a four year delay to the in-service date to 2009.
The February 2003 Agreement changed the contract from the previous fixed price basis, to a Target Cost Incentive Fee (TCIF) arrangement for Design and Development. A contract amendment to this effect was signed on 23 February 2004. This mechanism was supposed to be the best means of incentivising BAE SYSTEMS to deliver the aircraft without further cost and time slippage. Why has it not done so?
ISD was now defined as the Delivery of the sixth production standard aircraft to the Royal Air Force.
In July 2004, the UK Ministry of Defence announced that this number was to be further reduced to 12 aircraft.
A further review of the programme identified increased production costs and that the In-Service Date for the capability would need to be delayed in order to make the programme affordable within Departmental funding constraints. A business case seeking authorisation of commitment to full production was approved in May 2006, and the contract was amended to re-introduce the production requirements in July 2006.
The UK MOD finally awarded the production contract for 12 Nimrod MRA4 aircraft In July 2006. Delivery of the first production aircraft was by then planned for 2009. The scheduled in-service date had slipped to 2010 and deliveries were scheduled to be completed in 2012. Nimrod MRA4 has an assumed in-service life of 25 years based upon 650 flying hours per year. This results in an out of service date (OSD) of 2035, but a longer life may be feasible.
The MPR07 Definition of ISD is the provision of 5 aircraft (4 deployable) and 6 combat ready crews. It was then scheduled for September 2010 – 89 months late.
The latest information is that MRA4 is now 92 months (7.5 years) late, inferring a December 2010 ISD, and £787 m (28% of the Approved Cost) over budget.
£100 m of this cost growth (“just a little less than three per cent of the total programme cost”) and three months of this delay have been added during the last year alone, giving the lie to any idea that the problems are over. Three months more delay, and £100 m more to the excess costs sounds to me like the programme is still spiraling out of control (albeit perhaps at a slower rotational rate).
David Gould CB, Chief Operating Officer, DE&S told the House of Commons Defence Committee that: “The production, flight trial and mission system programmes are going very well.”
Are they? Was he knowingly lying to Parliament?
The NAO’s Major Projects Report 2007 forecast that all Key User Requirements would be met. Is that true, or were they misled?
The MRA4 KURs are:
01 Maritime Counter Terrorism
02 Search & Detect (UWE)
03 Submarine Attack
04 Search & Detect (AWE)
05 Tactical Interoperability
06 Mission Completion
07 Maritime Presence
08 Operations in Hostile Environment
09 Environmental Operating Conditions
KUR 08 was originally judged as being ‘at risk’, but the NAO judges that the “Technical and financial issues now resolved surrounding procurement of Electronic Warfare Rig thereby allowing aircraft to operate with a self-defence capability. Business Case with Investment Appraisal under compilation. Procurement schedule being determined; anticipate KUR compliance when schedule and risks clearly identified.”
Cost snippet:
1998 - £2 bn order for 21 aircraft = £95 m each
2004 - £3.5 bn for 15 aircraft = £233 m each
2006 - Cost now £3.2 bn for 12 aircraft = £267 m each
2008 – Cost now £3.6 bn for 12 aircraft = £300 m each