I’ve said before that I don’t subscribe to Walter’s theory. But, without doubt, much of what he’s proposing is a regular occurrence across the MoD. Noting the kit he discusses is, according to Boeing, a Service Engineered Modification, the answer to all the following questions is YES.
- Would the MoD/IPT lie to an investigator regarding the installation and/or reasoning behind a SEM?
- Would they deny all knowledge of the kit/SEM to investigators and, subsequent to a fatal crash, “lose” all documentation and Corporate knowledge?
- Would they permit an SEM to be fitted and used without first following the mandated airworthiness requirement to have it appraised and trialled?
- Would they permit it to be used knowing it to be unsafe?
- Would they issue a formal instruction to knowingly make it unsafe during use, placing the aircraft and occupants in grave danger? (That’s a cracker!).
- Would someone outside the engineering chain, and therefore not holding airworthiness or type approval delegation, be permitted to make engineering decisions on an SEM (or any kit) and order its installation, removal or modification, over-ruling previous decisions that, for example, the SEM is unsafe and should not be installed?
- Would they demand or grant “read across” from another aircraft without appraisal/assessment, again in breach of airworthiness regs?
- Would they maliciously blame someone whom they knew to be innocent?
All this occurred on one aircraft within the same management/airworthiness chain as Chinook. No, I don’t think Walter is right, but there are far greater things to worry about.