CONF iture, your personal view (#454) provides a succinct summary, but shouldn’t you have referenced the limiting crosswind, or at least the possibility that it was limiting, albeit unknown to the crew? Re earlier references to inaccuracies in wind measurement and reporting.
- Was the steady value (30kts) within or at the demonstrated value / limit, or if greater was the attempted approach inadvisable?
- Alternatively do you or any other operator consider the gusts as the limiting value? I note Chris Scott’s positive response earlier.
- Is there a compromise for a limiting condition between the steady state and a gust, if so what would it be?
- How many operators make the demonstrated crosswind value a limit? Why?
DozyWannabe, I don’t take
CONF iture's comments on Airbus as harsh as you do. Although the aircraft in the incident was an Airbus and from the discussion above its systems (or the crew’s understanding of them) may have been a factor, these are all points which can apply to many aircraft types.
There has been a vast amount of debate on the knowledge (or lack of) of the control systems and ‘how to’, but very little on what I believe could be a major contributor, that of the crosswind limit, a crew’s knowledge (or lack of) of limit derivation, wind measurement and reporting, and thus the risks that crew’s are prepared to take.
Thus the debate should not be so much about knowing how to conduct a crosswind landing, but instead consider the assessment of whether it is safe to do so in the conditions, and thus if any safety margin is required when planning to operate within ‘a limit’.