perconator,
for Option 5 could it be:
a. The US marines need a STOVL platform and if the UK joins them it is politically more difficult to cancel.
b. By having a short-range aircraft without much bombload it doesn't draw attention to how TLAM is not really 'strategic'?
(just kidding)
Also "the shore-based RAF"... have you missed the formation of the JFH and the planning for JCA? RAF and RN Harrier units are interchangeable at sea and on land and are planned to continue to be so with JSF.
But seriously:
Command States: I really think we need to get this right. A couple of posters have talked about things like having JSF "under RN command". Let's examine this.
We were supposed to have realised in WW2 that the three services do not fight three separate wars. Tactical aircraft will (almost always) be under OPERATIONAL command of the JFACC, regardless of which service operates them or exercises full command. This means two things:
1. IT DOES NOT MATTER, IN OPERATIONAL TERMS, WHETHER JSF (or any other carrier based-type) IS OPERATED BY THE RN OR THE RAF. No, really. I have a view on this, but it's based on what is best value for defence in terms of generating op capability, as opposed to the really important question of how the force elements are employed.
2. Our aim should be to deliver military power when and where it is needed, in the most effective and efficient way. To me, that means we cannot tie up a significant portion of our fast-jet force as dedicated assets to be sailed around on a carrier when the real fight might be elsewhere. I'm not ignoring the real issues about work-up, currency, etc, but unless we have an appetite to make step-ashore work (as SRO(C) advocates) then carriers become a less and less attractive way of projecting air power in an age when we are unlikely to have lots of jets.
Last edited by Occasional Aviator; 12th Mar 2008 at 00:40.