A couple of examples of ‘changed’ thinking; probably not the best, but they indicate the principle.
- During take off there is usually a ‘Power Set’ call. Add to this the value that is expected – e.g. “Power Set, Flex, 88%". The call aids comparison with the expected value (catches a mis set bug). With subsequent review the value can be ‘embedded’ in memory as a ball-park figure for the conditions of the day (wt, alt, temp, flex, etc). This expands personal knowledge of the aircraft and the operation, which again aids error detection in a range of situations (general rules of thumb).
The call also involves the other crew member in the setting / checking process – double check – defenses in depth as s/he might catch an error that you had missed.
In some pedantic operations, the calls above might be seen as a change to SOPs; thus, a change of SOP might be for the better, or it might trigger a review of the operation: – say them to yourself anyway.
- Before the approach, the approach and landing speeds are calculated from the weight, which should be checked against the maximum allowed. At this time state the percentage of landing weight or otherwise quantify the margin from the maximum allowed. This is a guide to the level of braking required on the runway (in the existing conditions), and as above, when reviewed in personal debrief for future memory recall they are available for used in ‘unexpected' situations - a process of adding experience.
In addition, it would be good practice to state the next worst case value, i.e. the margin on a wet runway if the landing calculation was for dry, or a contaminated value if the runway was wet. This provides a reminder if a sudden shower is encountered that a different level of braking will be required, or an alternate landing configuration, or even that the landing would be out of limits.