Just one question from a dumb colonial. Had the Kegsworth crew responded correctly, would airline safety have ever been improved? Put another way, would we have faced the same problem in a transition, for instance, from the B747-200 to the B747-800?
I'm pretty sure there's no answer to that question but I'll sit back and wait to be educated.
Ha ..at least this part of the discussion looks forward rather than backwards in hindsight
from my study of crew perfomance with engine failures there were many similar muck ups both before and after Kegworth. With all the data plus post event crew interviews I formed the opinion that you can't blame the human for a reaction, but instead have to look at the experience base and training. When you look at those issues you begin to see all the precursors.
Examples: the crew expected engine failures to be overt (lots of noise, vibration, left foot right foot stuff)
The training probably didn't address at that time the deciphering of engine gages in a CRM atmosphere before grabbing a throttle.
Lots has changed since then to address the crew training issues
see also the engine training material on this page
http://www.fromtheflightdeck.com/