Originally Posted by
twistedenginestarter
It is amazing that the crew had had zero simulator time on this aircraft type.
Indeed, although they had done a 737-300 type rating (same engines, different instruments).
It's fair to say that BMA (as they were then) badly let down the crew with a second rate training programme - a failing in which the CAA played a part by approving the course.
With regard to the smoke issue - on previous types that the captain had flown, the aircraft fed cabin air from the right hand engine and flight deck from the left. On the 737-400 the two bleed sources are mixed so can no longer be used to determine the source of the smoke and location of the failure.
I have had smoke problems on an aircraft due to a failed compressor and it was very hard to locate the source of the smoke (I saw the smoke in the cabin before I saw the smoke around my knees!) - but engine instrumentation is generally unequivocal.
The reports can be downloaded from the AAIB website and make interesting reading. When used as a case study on MCC/CRM training (and referring to their existing understanding of the chain of events), most students initially feel that the accident was beyond the control of the crew. After evaluating the data in the report, they always (in my experience) come round to the view that the crew rushed the decision making and diversion, mismanaged their own workshare and workload and failed to make full use of their available resources (cabin crew etc.).
This isn't "slagging them off", it's a matter of record and nothing more.
AAIB weblink for reports on this accident:
http://www.aaib.gov.uk/publications/..._90_502831.cfm