BMA accident at Kegworth
As my "Pen Name" suggests I am one of the older brigade, however I was involved in multi-engined operations for many years as a Flight Engineer on a variety of aircraft culminating on the B747.
My recollection of reports around the time of the Kegworth accident indicated the crew held a false notion that bleed air from only the No 2 engine was used in the operation of the air conditioning system, a notion which was planted in their minds by incorrect information from a ground instructor during conversion to type. When smoke was apparent, as a result of damage to the No 1 engine, the crew believed the Vibration indications "must" have been relative to the No 2 engine and in haste closed that engine down and at the same time commenced an emergency descent. The fact that the wrong engine had been shut down did not become apparent until the crew endeavoured to spool up the damaged operating engine, all too late in the approach to restart the No 2 engine. This was not the first time, nor will it be the last, that to have "hastened slowly" would have resulted in a better outcome.