Cazatou
I have always been aware of this consideration but made the point some time ago that, as the preceding post says, it is old tech now and, in my view, it would be hard to imagine anything worse happening to our service people than what happened that day, if indeed such equipment was misused on that occasion. That is why I believe we have more to gain security wise by exploring this possibility thoroughly - the implications to us all if this was the case are that serious.
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I do take your point that the Off Secrets Act is a powerful gag but it should not deter people who believe we live in a free and democratic society from speaking up when it is needed. If we do not live in such a society, just what is it we are trying to impose by force in those other areas of conflict that you refer to?
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Those of you who have a mental block as to how far our security services will go to achieve their ends should have a look at the revelation in that Diana inquest that MI something had plans to assassinate Milosovic (the arranged accident thing) - if they would contemplate knocking off a head of state of a country remote from the hearts and minds of the bulk of the British public, what would they do to remove an obstacle to the peace process in NI, a part of Britain which the politicians of the time (incl. the PM) openly expressed a desire that it should just go away - an open wound that has dragged on for decades and that has affected so many of us?
We owe it to the security team that was on board to explore any possibility, however unpalatable, of this being the case.
As things stand we have not even explained why they turned in towards that landing area despite the evidence for this.
A cover up to save embarrassment of a training exercise/demonstration that went wrong is not acceptable if it is blocking inquiry into the possibility of wilful interference in any such exercise.
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In short, I believe it better serves the public interest to fully analyse this crash than keeping it under wraps for some vague and general security considerations.
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With regard to that dig about being in Australia (someone's recent previous post) somehow avoiding responsibility re the Off Sec Act - I recently spent 3 months in the UK specifically to do research on this case - and no doubt will be returning soon for more of the same.
I worked for years in the defence industry in the UK and take security issues seriously - in this case it is not so much being irresponsible but rather having the courage of my convictions.
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I sincerely hope that this was just a tragic accident but, for me to be convinced, the following issues need to be addressed:
why was the weather and the a/c track misrepresented at the inquiries?;
why wasn't the existence of a previously used landing area so near the crash site mentioned?;
what could the handling pilot's HSI course selector have been aligned to?;
what other explanation is there for the a/c slowing down with altimeters set for landing whilst heading directly for a previously used landing area other than it was going to land or closely pass that area?;
who allocated a tactical callsign and what was its meaning?;
what was the SSR code before impact?;
why wasn't the call to Scot Mil answered?;
etc, etc.
If you think these points irrelevant and not worth discussion, look at the alternatives that have occupied so much of your time:
The control jam theory: - after turning right onto a heading that was on the handling pilot's HSI (therefore an intended turn), continuing to the crash site, and then responding to an emergency manouevre, the idea of a control jam seems ridiculous;
Engine runaway causing distraction: - the engines were found (closely) matched which does not fit with an engine runaway;
Inadequate rate of climb to overfly the Mull: - Boeing's analysis had it that they had started to slow down on that final leg which would have required a reduction in power at their high cruise speed and this was suppported by the engine settings and reduced rotor RPM as found to have been at impact - at their power and speed, they were so far short of clearing the ground, let alone reaching SALT, that this consideration is nonsense - they would have to have thought that they were so far away from the landmass (miles further than they were) for this to have been their intention and the SuperTANS wasn't that bad;
Disoriented in IMC; - they were not in IMC at the critical time of their decision to turn right at the position of waypoint change according to my understanding of the weather and they would have known of their general proximity to the landmass - they would have only had problems with the visibility if they had, for whatever reason, to directly approach the landmass beyond what was needed for an enroute passing.
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Got any other ideas?