Erebus 25 years on

[prospector]

Perhaps one can see the why of it from this passage from John King's publication.

"The one exception was Captain Roger Dalziells flight which, because of unfavourable McMurdo weather, took the alternative sightseeing route over the South Magnetic pole, diverting before even reaching the specified decision point of Cape Hallet. Its unpopularity with the passengers, however, was a likely factor in making Captain Collins more determined to press on to McMurdo when conditions were MARGINAL and, according to company instructions, WELL BELOW minima for the area.

Then to the information supplied to the crew.

The actual track and distance chart supplied to flight crews was a subject of considerable debate during the enquiry. Pilots giving evidence on behalf of NZALPA insisted it was exhibit 164, but Joe Lawton in his evidence said that three copies of Annex J of the Chippendale report which clearly showed the Southern waypoint as being Williams field, had been placed in the aircraft documents. From the evidence given, none of the pilots recalled definitely using either exhibit 164 or Annex J. Also found in the wreckage was exhibit 78, a copy of the NV90 computer printout structured as a skeleton flight plan with the waypoint names, tracks and distances, BUT THAT WAS NEVER ELABORATED ON DURING THE ENQUIRY.

Weighing the evidence presented before him-and the credibility of the witnesses themselves, Peter Mahon concluded that exhibit 164 was the track and distance chart supplied to Antarctic crews, and annex J was something the airline would rather had been found in the cockpit of the wrecked DC10. THAT CONCLUSION WAS ONE OF MANY LATER DISMISSED AT BOTH THE COURT OF APPEAL AND PRIVY COUNCIL HEARINGS.

Also
"The union showed more cohesion too, "The NZALPA evidence was all clearly rehearsed,' declares Ian Gemmel, who had visited all the other Antarctic pilots with chief accidents inspector Ron Chippendale when he was gathering evidence for his report. Their evidence differed from the interviews with Chippendale. Their answers were not the same as given to the Court of Inquiry, under oath, but they all agreed with the NZALPA's stance. NZALPA's plan was to get the pilot of the hook. They socialised with the judge during and after the case.

As for the VMC descent, nowhere in the company or CAA requirements for descent is VMC descent an option, it is clearly understood that any descent was to be inside the parameters as laid down and printed many times on this thread, not one of these requirements were met.

Requirement 4. was
Descent to be coordinated with local radar as they may have other traffic in the area.

My interpretation of this requirement would be first of all the flight would have had to have been identified on radar, and positon clearly established, before McMurdo radar could maintain separation between them and any other traffic.