But surely the point is that if the pilots aren't up to the concept of working out their descent path and then managing the flight profile then there is something wrong with the system of pilot selection/ company training and oversight? Surely we can't just say that because two dme check altitudes were omitted from a chart is a defence for what happened? I wouldn't consider having these two checks as being something that would have saved this approach or even something that would have 'given them a fighting chance'.
The point is, these "automatic monkeys" as TeeEmm calls them probably have never even heard of the concept.
If they are not capable of flying an non-precision approach then they shouldn't have flown one. Fact is, I bet they have been trained how to fly them and they do during recurrent training and checking, just like we all do. If they don't fly them very often then all the more reason to think clearly about it and revise required actions and brief thoroughly. Perhaps their training department could teach it more thoroughly, but this is pure speculation that their training wasn't up to the required (regulatory authority) standard.
They cannot reasonably be expected to invent a system that they may well have not even heard about
Nobody is saying they have to invent a system, just fly a non-precision approach the way their books say to. Everything offered on here has been how some of us do it to ensure least risk of a vertical profile cock-up. They WILL have been trained in the use of VNAV final approach descent (or if not they were breaking the rules). Problem is they didn't do it properly. There are sure to be many factors, but in my opinion they didn't minimise the risks before starting the approach and then didn't execute the briefed approach that well.
There is no perfect system and ILSs have to be taken off for maintenance every once in a while. If all that is left is a non-precision approach, so be it. Remember, they had plenty of clues that their approach was unstable and a Go Around could have (should have) been flown well before the EGPWS saved them (easy to say with hindsight, I know).
What we should all try to learn from such an event is
1. Non-precision approaches are inherently less safe that precision approaches.
2. They therefore require careful consideration before being flown and a clear plan of how you are going to fly them.
3. All FMC entries, but espcially manually entered ones need thorough cross-checking before entrusting the safety of the aircraft to them.
4. Flight procedures MUST be learn and understood and reviewed (even more regularly for infrequently used ones).
5. Fly within the SOPs. Follow the charts precisely.
6. Monitor closely the flight path during all approaches. PM call deviations and support PF fully.
7. Never be afraid to admit defeat and GO AROUND.
PP