blueloo, thanks for the chart, it appears to originate from Airservices Australia, which I believe is the originating legal reference. Note that the currency date (22 Nov 07) is after the date of the incident.
At least this chart only uses one range scale and defines the GPS range reference, thus avoiding any ambiguity in the use of altitude-range checks. I would prefer that the check table be formatted as ‘altitude over range’ as the former is far more important in achieving safe terrain clearance. Also adding (ML) next to ‘DME’ would further help to avoid misinterpretation.
The FAF is depicted – highlighting the weaknesses of the incident chart (but it’s their symbology – so much for world standardisation). The minimum approach altitudes appear to support the notion that the higher PANS-OPS value is used before the final nav aid (ROC), and that MDA applies thereafter. Both BOL and ROC ADFs are required.
Thus BOAC’s belief in this instance, is incorrect – beware those who think that dive and drive is safer! MDA is not a safe altitude inside the FAF.
"… are Captains good monitors?" No takers … of course there were three crew members, were they all looking outside?
This incident is a good example where investigations conclude ‘CRM failure’ without actually identifying which aspects or what the underlying causes for the human failures were. I have more confidence in ASTB, who show a keen interest in the HF aspects of events than do most investigators. We have much to learn from what initially appeared to be a 'minor incident'.