How can you leave the workload of the controller in the CTR out of the argument?
Because it’s a different argument. Making it safer over there and less safe over there is not a valid argument. You must look at them as the two things they are. For example you could have the Class C controlled by an approach controller and the circuit by an aerodrome controller; but by doing that you have effectively double the cost for similar risk. Transferring what now is C to E and thus from Tower to enroute does not offset the ‘circuit’ risk savings by enabling the tower controller to do a ‘better’ job.
I have spoken to controllers all around the world in relation to this particular issue. The controllers in the United States have said that if they were responsible for Class C airspace to 8,500 feet above the D at Lihue, safety would actually be reduced.
Well
dur, I do not dispute that. But that’s what they started with. I’m sure if you said to the enroute/app controllers in such circumstances and said we would take away that piece of airspace and give it to the towers they too would see safety for their chunk of airspace increasing.
Why did they say this? They said because they wouldn’t be able to concentrate on the traffic close to the runway where the accidents are likely to happen.
But because the collision highest risk is at the airport it doesn’t mean there is no risk in the ‘enroute’ phase of flight. Australian controllers have developed ‘coping mechanisms’ for ensuring safety, these may be delayed clearances or reduced through put or clearances that enable VFRs to be separated from other aircraft, so that when workload permits, closer attention can be given; until then ‘it’s safe’ a fall back position if you will.
SM4Pirate, you never answer this point. Are these controllers wrong?
I didn’t realise that I was personally being asked; see above, but it’s more complex than they said so there for they are right. I say they are not wrong; but if you simply by the stroke of a pen, and (sic) fast cultural training, make change, then it’s not actually addressing all the issues. You can’t make risk ‘savings here’ and offset the risk ‘increases there’, despite your belief of this, it doesn’t and shouldn’t work that way.
I have always agreed that C is safer than E, but only if it is adequately staffed and you actually know where the VFR aircraft are.
Yes but the same ‘limitations’ to unknown VFRs apply to class E.
When the controllers in Australia have to be responsible for huge amounts of Class C airspace as well as the D, do you accept that even to a small degree, the concentration of the controller on traffic close to the airport would be reduced – even slightly – by VFR aircraft calling and requiring a service in the Class C airspace above? It is simply logical commonsense to me and to many others I have spoken to.
I totally agree, see comments about coping mechanisms, note the resistance to use FAA D clearance procedures it’s about being better able to manage. But as I also said, increasing the circuit safety is not equally and proportionately offset by the other options you have proposed. If our circuit risk was so bad it would be reflected in the stats, it’s no better or worse than the FAA stats.
I have pointed out to overseas controllers the view that Australian controllers have – that is, they can provide the extra service of C airspace above D, and believe the combination actually improves safety, not decreases safety. The overseas controllers all say this is not possible.
There is a valid argument about knowing about VFRs earlier increases safety; knowing about transiting traffic enables you to act early and formulate a plan; You will note a relatively recent USA class D tower collision where damages were awarded because separation was not provided. The basis of the judgement was that to land the aircraft spacing was needed, so it should have been applied before the circuit by the controller.
I find it interesting that you won’t even discuss this point and give any acceptance to the validity of the argument – even if it only has a small effect.
You obviously have me confused with someone-else, I have always accepted your comments about C vs E over D relating to the circuit, I don’t accept your argument that you can simply increase the enroute risk because you are reducing the terminal risk. I say that you are kidding yourself about the true benefits of that risk reduction; because if truly was significant it would be supported by the high incident rates that would be easily identified.
Is there anyone game to discuss the point made by overseas professional controllers that having too much airspace controlled by just one controller can actually reduce safety under some circumstances by capturing traffic which has very low collision risk possibility?
You are asking for USA style class E, without supporting the USA style sectors controlling that E; to distract an enroute controller with IFR to VFR (traffic, if it’s seen) or low level IFR to IFR separation (procedural too) whilst dealing with high level traffic on a single manned console using the argument that the risk is low, so acceptable is flawed. If an enroute controller banged two 737s together because they are too busy separating two IFR chieftains close to terrain without surveillance, hence they had your highest attention, when previously the tower could have used their eyes to apply visual separation (called "Azimuth"); where exactly is the risk benefit?
It is not lawful to say risk here = X risk there = y, so we can make here = Z and there = t. You need to really assess it.
Blanket assessments such as global (national) change don’t stack up very well. It might be very easy to do an individual assessment, much easier than a national one. Particularly where surveillance is actually available; the risk over Nth QLD towers and LT for example would be negligible because radar is a available; but AY, CH, TW, AS, HB might be harder to achieve the same.
I’m willing to have a real discussion rather than he said she said bs; but please don’t try and paint me as a change resistant fundamentalist, unionised ATC. I’m all for change when the benefits are real and definable; I don’t like the concept of reduction here for increase there... Why not just have reductions; surely we can afford it;
maybe we could spend some of the ASA profit on improvements?