An aviation accident is NEVER the result of the failure of one person or component of a system. It is usually the culmination of a series of failures in different areas that has led to safety margins being erroded to the point where an accident occurs.
Prosecution of flight crew or ground crew who have done their job in good faith and to the best of their ability will not help air safety at all.
I think NEVER is taking it a bit far...
and '
Prosecution of flight crew or ground crew who have done their job in good faith '
pushing it a bit for this situation...
1) Warning
one that any
professional would take note of when entering a responsible position in charge was... 'I am stressed, I have had another argument with the missus (or so it was said)... I shall be doubly careful at this time, and rely more on my FO's abilities and team work to keep safe (whatever words I use will be criticised, but don't all say a pilot's self-check list shouldn't include a brief moment of reflection when entering his 'office')
2) I know I am diverging a long way from SOP, but I will continue... as this will get 'some' of my passengers down safely.. Mmm...
3) Someome else above is suggesting this pilot, after travelling across the threshold nearly 100 kts too fast, can take comfort in that should he run off the end, criminal responsibility will lie with the aiport operators, as they have a very tenuous hold on their licence, and the run-off is jknown to be dangerous...
IMHO, Accident Investigation History and a study of classic cases should perhaps be given more prominent attention in commerical pilot training,
worldwide.
The one I hear litttle of these days, yet was pretty salutary at the time, was the terrible Trident/Staines deep-stall on take-off circa early 70's... pre-flight argument/stress/ignoring the aircraft's built in safety devices
I know it hit BEA hard at the time and the lessons permeated their flight-crew selection and training, lessons which have borne fruit in the longer term and no doubt still influence BA's thinking.