With regard to the Puma accident in Aberdeen, there were additional behind the scenes discussions, as one might expect, at the time. There was a suggestion that the accident was as a result of mishandling of the SSL`s following the previous exercise involving a running landing. Inputs from various agencies around at the time of the accident suggest that additional pressures were being applied, namely time constraints, instructor relatively new to the type, first officer under training in an unfamiliar crew seat, ie right instread of left. The immediate upshot was the requirement to carry a safety pilot on the jump seat whose sole responsibility was to guard the SSL`s.
The early 332L`s were prone to spurious fire warnings with one engine at idle and one at max contingency ie OEI training. This happened to me on my 1179 check at Marignane downwind at night. The Bristow training captain was conducting the test from the jump seat with a French instructor as safety pilot in the left hand seat. On departure, one engine was failed beyond CDP and the take off continued. After completing touch drills I turned downwind in the circuit at which point the fire warning illuminated on the good engine. The French pilot who had been gazing out of the window immediately reached up and stopcocked the good engine. It was only the timely intervention of the Brit training captain who managed to advance the `failed` engine swiftly enough to prevent us joining the other members of my course who were at a pizza restaurant in the village of Marignane that evening. I don`t speak French but luckily the training captain did and judging by the volume today`s CRM guidelines were not followed!