Originally Posted by Crossunder
The idea of "complacency" is just another desperate try from the human performance buffs to say something meaningful about "human factors".
It is an almost completely meaningless term when it comes to trying to unserstand how humans and machines interact. It is just another way of saying "human error". It makes a "neat" and "holistic" case for studying folk models of how accidents occur. "Complacency" is equally non-specific as the Yerkes-Dodson "U-curve".
Automation does not just solve problems. Like any other innovation/solution it creates new problems as well. If you cannot trust in automation - why use it? Using the word "complacency" in an accident investigation is just judgemental and over simplistic. One often hears that "the crews trust in automation was UNJUSTIFIED". So far, I have never seen anyone try to explain why the assumption of satisfactory system state was regarded as JUSTIFIED by the crew. If their trust in autiomation were unjustified, and the crew knew that, they would not make the assumption and would consequently not become "complacent".
I´ll write more later, after the staunch folk model worshippers have had their say!
Well, at least as much as the psychologists of the world are still in disagreement as to the accuracy, let alone the value, of the Yerkes-Dodson “curve,” there are differing opinions among aviators (and those who comment on aviation) regarding when and where to use the term “complacency,” at least as much as there are differing opinions as to what is actually meant when that term is used. There are many who would argue with the premise that being or becoming complacent is not necessarily an error on anyone’s part – and if these persons are operating under the accepted definition of the term, they would be correct. Complacent means self-satisfied … nothing more … nothing less. To be “satisfied” is not necessarily making an error. One can be exposed to a set of deteriorating circumstances, take some actions to reverse that trend, and be satisfied that the actions taken are, or will become, sufficient to change those circumstances. The fact that the person is satisfied the actions taken are, or will be, sufficient is not necessarily an error – particularly if those actions are those that were taught to be the correct ones. If the circumstances are not reversed or they are not mitigated to the extent that the person is satisfied with the actions taken, there are three possible conclusions that could be reached regarding that collective situation: 1) the person erred in assessing the circumstances; 2) the person erred in applying the actions taken; or 3) the actions that were taught to be taken were, in fact,
not the correct actions – or a combination of these realities.
Certainly, aviation is a dynamic set of human and natural interactions, and, as such, any one circumstance cannot logically be taken in isolation, as in the situation I just described. The key, obviously, is to continually (as opposed to constantly) assess the situation and continually make decisions about the existing, and evolving, circumstances – and taking action, or more accurately, a series of actions, accordingly, to achieve and maintain satisfactory flight. But, I believe that does not change the premise I described above. That is, being satisfied the actions taken are, or will become, sufficient is not necessarily an error – particularly if those actions are those that were taught to be the correct ones.
I agree completely with your premise that “Automation does not just solve problems. Like any other innovation/solution it creates new problems as well.” I am hoping that the objection you registered comes from the fact that “stopping” the search for the reason for the occurrence under investigation at the point the term “complacency” is used is at least as much in error as may be the use of the term in the first place. I say this because I don’t believe it is a matter of “trusting” or “not trusting” the automation.” The automation, unless it fails, when engaged properly at the correct time, is very likely going to do just exactly what it was designed and installed to do. The problem is, that, alone, may be insufficient under the circumstances. In fact, it may contribute to a further unwanted circumstance – and will most likely do so in those cases where the precise functioning of the automation (including sequencing) is either not known or not considered by either the organization having conducted the training or the person currently activating the automation. And there are several examples available that highlight this process.
But there is a further problem with automation that has nothing to do with the timing of its use, its functional programming, or its limitations. It has to do with psycho-motor skills; the skills of thinking and doing, equally, with respect to a particular goal. Piloting an aircraft is very heavily dependant on the psycho-motor skills a pilot develops and practices. And the key word here is “practices.” Even the most mundane and most basic of skills tend to deteriorate over time without sufficient, periodic practice – and unfortunately, I can provide an overabundance of examples, anecdotal as they may be, of just such deterioration because of what I describe as an “over reliance” on automation in day-to-day operations. I am concerned that, with today’s almost completely “automatic,” computer-controlled aircraft, there is a question as to whether or not some pilots ever truly have the opportunity to develop, let alone practice, some of the skills that are necessary in a non-computer-controlled environment – which means in an airplane not designed to be computer-controlled, or a computer-controlled airplane in which the computers have decided to “take a hike.” No pilot who has ever hand-flown an ILS in a dark and stormy night more than once would ever denigrate proper and properly used automation. But, as much as automation was developed to assist the pilot, the fallacy has been that many believe that having such automation available warrants a lessening of the time necessary to devote to training. Those who believe this, do so because it
is easier, and quicker, to teach the use of automation. But what is often overlooked is the very real possibility of not having the automation at some point – for one of an ever-expanding list of reasons. It is at this point when fundamental “stick-n-rudder” training becomes a lamented loss. Arriving at this juncture is, in my book, what deserves the description
COMPLACENCY.
Regarding automation, what is necessary, in my (not so humble) opinion, is two things: 1) the cessation of “over reliance” on automation in day-to-day operations – which I would expand to a “lessening of reliance” on the computer in day-to-day operations of computer-controlled airplanes; and 2) training the crew to be more “in the loop” when automation is being used.
I, too, will await comments.