The "Threat" of Automatic Complacency
The latest issue of the United States flight safety magazine called (appropriately) "Flight Safety" Volume XXVIII, Number 1 for January 2008, has a short paragraph advertising future articles. One of them is called "Automatic Complacency: Why it's so easy to get lazy and what you can do about it."
It got me thinking that despite documented research that over-reliance on full automation can lead to the habit known as "Automatic Complacency", both Boeing and Airbus push for full use of automatics as being the safest way to operate their aircraft. So how does one define over-reliance? Certainly simulator syllabus for Boeing and Airbus operators whether type rating or recurrent training, accent the full use of automatics.
Where does this leave a pilot who wishes to avoid "automatic complacency?"
Even those operators who permit occasional hand flying invariably require the flight directors and auto-throttles to be engaged - in other words retaining partial automatics.
So is this subject just a case of do what I say (avoid automatics complacency) not do as I do (full automatics for as long as possible take off to touch-down?).
And given that full use of automatics is strongly recommended - for example the introduction to Normal Procedures in the 737 states: "Normal procedures are used by a trained flight crew and assume all systems operate normally and the full use of all automated features LNAV, VNAV, autoland, autopilot and auto-throttle." - then what measures remain to combat "The Threat" of automatic complacency?