First, a minor correction. The report was written by the TSB, not TC.
As to what to train? The first one that comes to mind for me is the decision as to whether or not to continue an approach in conditions where the missed approach path is not a safe option due to severe weather, such as on the accident day in YYZ. Even when an approach is perfectly stabilized, a go around must always be considered as an equal possibility to a successful landing. You never know when someone will miss the hold line, followed by the tower ordering a go-around. That way, when a missed approach is required, it doesn't come as a surprise and one is better prepared to carry it out.
Stabilized approach criteria need to be considered all the way to the landing flare. Just because we're stable at 1,000 ft or 500 ft (or whatever our SOP says), does not gaurantee that we'll be stable at 100 ft.
Touchdown point awareness is also an important element of effective landing decision making.
We all think about "Contaminated Criteria" when there's lots of snow and ice around. We need to start thinking about it when the runway is wet as well. When it starts to rain heavy in thundershowers, a runway can quickly become as slippery as if there were more than an inch of snow on it.
But again, the decision to continue the approach in the first place was, for me, the key link in the accident chain that so easily could have prevented it.
FWIW
Jeff