RBF re #38 “Survival odds going off the end at 80 some kt. are much better than in a failed go-around.”
Your statement is very much open to debate; there is no evidence that a go around would have failed. Furthermore, if taken at face value and used in other situations the statement could be hazardous. Compare the result of the YYZ overrun with the accident at Congonhas and then argue against a GA.
There are many ways of representing the YYZ situation; I choose TEM / decision-making.
A critical point was the decision to make the approach. The threats at this time were either ill-defined (information not available) or known but not adequately considered (risk assessment). Contributions to the latter activity would involve human behaviour and industry norms. Thus in hindsight the decision to make the approach in the prevailing conditions was an error, a weakness in judgement, also made by several crews preceding the accident.
The report observed that it is industry standard to make such approaches, i.e. we bear the risk as a normal operation whereas perhaps we should not – industry complacency. Perhaps this is because we don’t understand (or wish to acknowledge) how close to the edge of the safety boundary we operate (yet statistically still remain a very safe industry). For example the 1.96 wet runway landing distance factor may have to be 2.2-2.4 to maintain a level of safety consistent with a dry operation (TC report on landing on wet runway).
The conclusion from a wide range of successful wet operations is that crews adapt and correct for the lower level of safety. However, occasionally crews either do not adapt or get caught out, and it is the solution to preventing these situations which the industry must concentrate on.
During the approach up to the point of touchdown, there was opportunity to correct the ‘error’ by flying a go around. The reason for this option being rejected and continue with the landing reside deep in human behavior, but probably these are similar behaviors to those in the original decision to make the approach, ‘press-on-itis’.
All of the crews landing in the stormy conditions were doing their best, but were let down by the limitations in the availability and accuracy of information describing the situation, the limits of human behavior, and the safety norms and values of modern operations.
The comprehensive report provides a well balanced view of the accident and the human involvement. However, the recommendation for training to help pilots to make better landing decisions in deteriorating weather still begs the question what exactly do we train?
Refs:
Safety aspects of aircraft performance on wet and contaminated runways.
Safety aspects of tailwind operations.
Aircraft Braking Performance on Wet Concrete Runway Surfaces.
Wet Runway Friction: Literature and Information Review.
Managing threats and errors during approach and landing.