CaptainMidnight, I have spoken to controllers (admittedly a small number) who work in Class D towers and are not happy with the present system – i.e. the Class C above D. They have said that they are not game to say this publicly because they would be lynched by the small but vocal group who has a very different view.
My suggestion is that you have a look at some of the incidents that occur in Class D – things like aircraft being cleared for take off at Alice Springs and the pilot coming back and saying, “Ahh, isn’t that a vehicle on the runway?”
None of these incidents are ever looked at in relation to whether the controller made the error because of workload in separating aircraft in the Class C airspace above – without even radar.
As I have mentioned previously, the serious incident at Hamilton Island took place when the controller was holding aircraft outside the zone. What was not looked at is how much the pressure of doing this (i.e. knowing they were holding people in a single engine aircraft orbiting over water) added to the situation which allowed the error regarding the IFR airline aircraft to take place.
It is interesting that when I have explained to US controllers how the Australian system works (with a single controller operating not only the Class D airspace to 4,500 feet but also the Class C to 8,500 feet and up to 90 miles across) they say I must be mistaken. They cannot believe that such a situation can exist and that controllers would accept Class C without radar.
Of course we will only need one accident in Class D airspace to move to follow international practice. That is, where Class E airspace is above the Class D (meaning that controllers can concentrate on the airspace close to the aerodrome) or where approach radar is provided with adequate staffing levels.
Last edited by Dick Smith; 19th Dec 2007 at 20:19.