“There is nothing more frightful than ignorance in action.” Goethe
From the NTSB accident report NYC04FA117:
The pilot stated he recalled:
1. He did not have any specific recollection regarding the beginning of the accident sequence.
2. The pilot could not provide any specific details regarding the control forces he experienced.
3. He did not recall observing any warning lights, or hearing any audible warnings.
4. The pilot did not recall reporting any specific problems over the radio.
The Safety Board reviewed the helicopter's last radio transmissions, which were recorded by the JFK air traffic control tower. A distress transmission was received from the accident helicopter; which stated, "Chopper 4 tail rotor failure I'm going for the Sears and Roebuck." The microphone in the helicopter appeared to be keyed for some time after the distress call. A second transmission from the accident helicopter began ten seconds after the first, which stated, "Chopper 4 I'm going down." Approximately three seconds later, a sound similar to a warning horn was heard for one second, followed by a break, followed by another second of warning horn. There were no further known transmissions from the accident helicopter.
A pilot seated in the rear seat stated that he was not able to look at the instrument panel and was not aware if any warning lights illuminated; however, he did hear an intermittent horn.
The onboard reporter stated that he also heard a warning horn and observed a red or green warning light illuminate
The pilot attended a Eurocopter factory training course for the AS-355, which utilized a dual hydraulic pump system, on June 25, 1982. He had not attended a factory training course for the AS-350.
During an interview, the pilot initially stated that he did not perform the required hydraulic system checks prior to flight, because he did not want to "fool around" with the hydraulic system. In a follow-up interview, the pilot said that he performed the required hydraulic system checks before the first flight on the date of the accident; however, during an interview, the pilot seated in the rear seat stated that he specifically recalled that the pilot did not perform the hydraulic system checks before either flight on the date of the accident.