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Old 13th Jul 2001, 20:20
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K52
 
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: Colchester UK
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The composition of the Select Committee appears to be what one would expect from Their Lordships House - cross party representation including members of the English and Scottish Bar.

As you are ALL no doubt aware, a BOI is an administrative proceeding and NOT a Court Martial. Although the evidence is taken on oath that evidence is not admissible in any subsequent legal proceedings: a separate Summary of Evidence has to be taken. The Pilots of ZD576 were NOT found “guilty of Manslaughter” but were deemed to have been “Grossly Negligent” in their conduct of the flight.

The basis of this finding was “ the crew of ZD 576 neither maintained Visual Flight Rules nor made a safe transition to Instrument Flight Rules.”; a statement amply borne out by the deliberations of the BOI:-

para 16e
“The weather was suitable for the flight but would have required flight in accordance with IFR in the vicinity of the Mull of Kintyre.”

para 51
“During this phase of the flight, to continue flying visually, the crew would have needed to adjust the aircraft’s height and airspeed to the prevailing cloudbase and visibility. The Board assessed that the possibility of the crew visually acquiring the lighthouse was remote, given the fact that it was in fog at the time. The hillside from lighthouse elevation to summit was also in cloud, although their were irregular areas of improved visibility up to 500m. The general weather close to the Mull was also very poor, with broken cloud at 200ft and 500m visibility below. Furthermore, any visual contact with the Mull or Lighthouse in the prevailing weather conditions should have prompted a reduction in height and speed well below those at impact.”

para 54
“ If the crew did not have visual contact with the Mull, and had decided not to attempt a landfall in the vicinity of the lighthouse, they would in the opinion of the Board, have been faced with 2 options: to turn away from land and attempt to route VFR towards Corran, parallel to their intended track but over the sea to the west of the Mull of Kintyre peninsula, until clear of the poor weather; or to climb to a safe height and fly over the Mull of Kintyre on track, accepting a change of in-flight conditions to IMC if necessary” NB At para 32c the BOI state “ in the forecast conditions, the icing clearance would have allowed an IMC pull-up from low level flight to Safety Altitude over the Mull of Kintyre.”

para 56
“ it would have been possible for the aircraft to have avoided the ground, whilst remaining on track, from any point beyond the position of the WP change until some 4 seconds prior to impact, if the crew had initiated a cyclic climb. After that point, assuming that its track and airspeed had remained constant, it would not have been possible for the aircraft to have avoided striking the terrain. The Board considered why the crew had not been alerted to their proximity to the ground, by either visual sighting or radar altimeter information, at any time from coasting - in until the initiation of the flare prior to impact. The lack of visual warning appears to indicate that the crew had lost all visual references and were in IMC during this phase of the flight. ----- The positioning of the Rad Alt bugs would have limited the crew to either a visual or a visual and audio warning at 69ft, depending on selection of the audio selector switch which could not be determined. This warning would have been too late, in the circumstances, to prevent impact with the ground.” NB. At para 45b the Board concluded
“ that the Rad Alt setting procedures used by the crew were a contributory factor in the accident.”

Finally, much has been made of the comment by Sir William Wratton that “ Without the irrefutable evidence which is provided by an ADR and CVR, there is inevitably a degree of speculation as to the precise detail of the sequence of events in the minutes and seconds prior to impact.” I suggest, although I do not know, that he may have been acknowledging the comment of the BOI at para 61 regarding their decision as to the most probable cause of the accident - “ the Board could not avoid a degree of speculation.”
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