Cazatou was quite right to point out:
<< Because there was no evidence of any technical malfunction there was no fleetwide programme of rectification or modification in order to prevent a further occurence because no technical fault had been identified as the cause of the crash.
It is now more than 13 1/2 years since this tragedy - years that have seen the commitments placed on the Chinook fleet increase markedly. They are operating under conditions that have not been seen by the RAF since WW2; with limited resources and under constant threat of hostile action. This length of time is greater than the combined durations of the Boer War, WW1 and WW2 - yet there has been no repetition of this tragedy. >>
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In one of my previous posts (#2863) I had brought up the discussion at one of the inquiries where it was acknowledged that a double axis control jam that freed itself at the last moment was one in billions of hours – “Boeing had, from December 1994, discounted the probability of a loose article jamming the flight controls and had withdrawn a previous requirement for visual checks. …”.
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And let’s dispel the illusion some may have got from reading this thread that the “FADEC” was some exotic feature unique to the HC2 – FADEC is pretty much a generic term for the computer control systems used in the majority of a/c jet engines today – the advantages of relieving the pilot workload, stress on the components, and efficiency far outweigh the disadvantages of an additional complex piece of equipment in the control chain.
If you check the track up to the last few seconds (waypoint change to initial impact) on a large scale chart/map as I recommend you do, you will see that the track is the same (035M) as set on the handling pilot’s HSI - entirely consistent with them following a deliberate course, being surprised by their proximity to the landmass/mist, and in the last few seconds starting an evasive manoeuvre (to the left) which explains all that is known about this crash.
Any engine runaway on this (short) leg would surely have been like the hand of God lifting them to safety (however temporary with regard to icing, etc). In fact, the power settings were found to have been “matched” which is hardly consistent with an engine runaway, is it?
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Unpleasant though it is to confront, but if they had not been doing some special task in that vicinity, then they had put themselves in danger needlessly. How about a little effort into considering the parameters that (as I have pointed out so often) point to their approaching the landing area closely for some reason? Trying to get an agreed picture with which to confront the authorities?
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The only way you’ll be getting the objective of clearing their names with your present course of action will be because the elapsed time is such that an admission that there could have been another cause other than pilot error would not now be so disturbing to the political process – and running around in circles trying to prove that the a/c could have been at fault and not considering anything else (that may be a distraction to this objective) has assisted the authorities in achieving this (desired?) delay.
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I say again, there was no evidence of the type of fault with the a/c that you have been suggesting yet there is evidence, both direct and circumstantial, that points to some intentional activity at the landing area by waypoint A.
If the latter was the case, then there was an opportunity for someone else to have been culpable in this crash and because of the role of the personnel on board every effort needs to be made to either eliminate or confirm the possibility of foul play – and prosecute those culpable accordingly.
Anything less than this is a betrayal of justice to everyone on board.
It is not so much of an achievement to just clear the names of the pilots if they had not been at fault anyway, is it? – surely we all want to know the whole truth.