Originally posted by joernstu
The Piper involved in the Aeromexico 498 collision (31.08.1986) was not equipped with a mode-C capable transponder.
This is correct and the statement that the PA-28 had mode-C was an error on my part.
Originally posted by PBL
That statement is hard to reconcile with your statement that it is "irresponsible" for me to publish them on this forum.
I don't disagree with your technical shortcomings that you claim TCAS has(and the publishing of them on this forum). I assume that they are what you say they are. What I disagree with are two conclusions that you and a colleague have come to based on these shortcomings which are probably highly uncommon occurences. You know the two statements I am referring to.
No doubt airspace changes such as TCA's(or should I say class B airspace) and mode-C veils have reduced midair collision potential. Is this what a confounding factor is? While we have seen several fatal midairs over the years(outside the U.S.) such as...
30 July 1971; All Nippon Airways 727-200 vs jet fighter; northern Honshu, Japan, CA-155 dead.
5 March 1973; Iberia DC9-32 vs Convair 880; Nantes, France-68 dead
1979 Aug 11 - Tupolev Tu-134 vs.Tupolev Tu-134 Near Dniprodzerzhynsk, USSR -178 dead
12 November 1996; Saudia 747-100 vs Il-76; near New Delhi, India-349 dead
29 September 2006; Gol Linhas Aereas 737-800 vs ERJ-135; near Peixoto de Azevedo, Brazil-154 dead
Sep 13 1997 - Luftwaffe TU-154 vs USAF C141 over Namibia, Africa-33 dead
...where properly working TCAS in both aircraft(or TCAS in one and working transponder inthe other) would likely have prevented them, there has never been a midair collision event caused when TCAS was installed and properly used. And actually, only one fatal accident when improperly using TCAS. Improper use of many different types of equipment has caused many deaths in aviation. No engineering data on my part just real world knowledge.
Page 103 of the midair accident report states in part:
The TU-154 AOM contains general recommendations regarding the use of TCAS. The AOM reference draws attention to the fact that manouvering opposite to TCAS can lead to a collision.
The TU-154 AOM stated that manouvering opposite to the RA is PROHIBITED.
The actions taken by the Tu-154 captain that night were not rational , they were, to use non-engineering terminology...
F
ing Insane.
As for the JAL incident, In the end it was an attempt to visually avoid conflicting traffic against the command of the TCAS RA. The causes leading up to the RA are irrelevant and could very well be due to different errors in each situation. Our discussion is about how to react to an RA.
I still eagerly await any
engineering facts on the ability to successfully manouver visually around TCAS conflicting traffic while climbing or descending toward that traffic.